

Playing With Fire: Fracked Gas Transport in Florida

The oversupply of natural gas on the heels of the fracking boom has resulted in the buildout of liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure across the country. LNG is fracked gas super-cooled into a liquid state so it can be transported to areas not reached by gas pipelines.¹ LNG infrastructure emits pollutants and can cause leaks, spills and explosions.² Moreover, it locks in fossil fuel use that is driving the climate catastrophe. Florida is already on the frontlines of the climate crisis, as hurricanes and storms get more extreme, sea levels continue to rise and pristine coastal fronts rapidly disappear.³ LNG expansion threatens to deepen the crisis.

Industry's Expansion Threat

LNG liquefaction facilities receive fracked gas by pipeline and cool it to a liquid state. The resulting LNG requires a fraction of the volume to store compared to fracked gas and can be transported in intermodal (ISO) containers, making it attractive to exporters.⁴ Many of these liquefaction facilities are located near ports, which then load LNG containers onto ships that sell to Caribbean markets, feeding the American gas export boom.⁵ LNG can also be transported and stored domestically, where it is later warmed back to a gas state and used in homes and businesses.⁶ Additionally, LNG is increasingly being used as a fuel in vehicles, from trucks to trains to cruise ships.⁷

Despite industry's greenwashing,⁸ LNG is still a dirty energy source with little to no climate benefits over other fossil fuels.⁹ Rather, pursuing LNG exports extends a lifeline to the fossil fuel industry that threatens to offset any domestic reductions in fracked gas consumption.¹⁰

Exporting LNG requires prior federal approval.¹¹ However, some companies are evading federal oversight when liquefying or transporting LNG domestically. For instance, companies can petition the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to confirm that the agency has no jurisdiction over a proposed project. Yet companies like New Fortress Energy are building LNG facilities without bothering to even obtain this confirmation. This includes a Miami-Dade liquefaction and storage facility that has been operating since 2016.¹²

A "Bomb on Wheels"

In 2017, the Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) obtained a special permit from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to carry LNG by rail in ISO containers from a Hialeah


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liquefaction facility owned by its affiliate, New Fortress Energy, to Port Everglades and PortMiami (Figure 1). That same year, FEC converted its entire fleet on its Jacksonville-Miami line to run on this LNG fuel.¹³ In 2020, following lobbying by the railroad industry, the Trump administration loosened regulations to allow LNG transport by DOT-113 tank cars without any additional safety precautions — almost a year before the federal safety assessment of these cars was set to be released.¹⁴

While a November 2021 proposed rule from the Biden administration would suspend the Trump rule, no company to date has yet to transport LNG in DOT-113 cars. Thus, the rule has no impact over railroad companies like FEC that have special permits to transport LNG in ISO containers — yet another loophole polluters are exploiting for profit.

A Food & Water Watch analysis using Geographic Information System (GIS) mapping programs found that an estimated 575,000 people live within the one-mile evacuation zone surrounding Florida's the liquefied gas transport routes. Frighteningly, a total of 228 K-12 schools (both public and private) fall within the blast zone, as do 13 hospitals. Communities of color and residents living in poverty are overrepresented within the evacuation zone.

Fig. 1: South Florida's Bomb Trains



Source: Food & Water Watch analysis of U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. To access the interactive map and view the methodology, visit <https://foodandwater.maps.arcgis.com/apps/mapviewer/index.html?webmap=a969674187dd41f7808aa53f0bc551ae>

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Transporting LNG in any container is tremendously risky. LNG must remain below minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit or it will regasify, meaning that leaks form invisible, flammable vapor clouds. LNG fires burn hotter and more rapidly than oil or gasoline, and can be worsened by water — so much so that first responders are instructed not to extinguish them but rather to evacuate the surrounding area and let the fires burn themselves out.¹⁵ A National Academies of Sciences report described in grim details what a “worst-case” scenario from an LNG tank car spill and fire would entail. The scenario included combustible vapors extending 1.5 miles and second-degree burns up to 0.4 miles.¹⁶

Fuel train derailments are disastrous; the 2013 oil train explosion in the small town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec killed 47 people and flattened the downtown area.¹⁷ Frighteningly, due to FEC’s unique authorization to carry LNG via rail, an experiment could now be happening on rail routes that travel across numerous highways and through densely populated areas. To make matters worse, these LNG trains could also share tracks with high-speed passenger trains with a notoriously poor safety record.¹⁸

We must stop LNG expansion

LNG industry expansion in Florida is dangerous and counterproductive — especially given that clean, renewable energy is not only viable in Florida, but largely untapped.¹⁹ Plus, the only way to meaningfully mitigate the disastrous effects of climate change is to move away from fossil fuels altogether.

President Biden and Congress must stop new LNG infrastructure, block all LNG exports and permanently ban LNG transport by rail in any container, including overturning FEC’s special permit. Federal action must be paired with local commitments. Local leaders must protect their communities from dangerous LNG operations by taking action to stop new proposals and halt current operations.

Endnotes

- ¹ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM). (2021). [Prepublication copy]. *Preparing for LNG by Rail Tank Car: A Review of a U.S. DOT Safety Research, Testing, and Analysis Initiative*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press at 9.
- ² Al-Breiki, Mohammed and Yusuf Bicer. “Comparative life cycle assessment of sustainable energy carriers including production, storage, overseas transport and utilization.” *Journal of Cleaner Production*. Vol. 279. January 2021 at 1 to 2; Tetra Tech, Inc. Prepared for U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). “Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Port Delfin LNG Project Deepwater Port Application.” Docket No. USCG-2015-0472. July 2016 at appendix R.
- ³ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). [Fact sheet]. “What Climate Change Means for Florida.” EPA 430-F-16-011. August 2016 at 1.
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- ⁶ Ospina, Andres. “Innovative natural gas facility in Homestead will benefit customers and community.” *Go! Latinos Magazine*. December 6, 2020.
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- ⁸ Vantuono (2017) at 1.
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- ¹² "New Fortress seeks US court review of FERC decision over Puerto Rico LNG facility." *S&P Global Platts*. May 26, 2021; O'Driscoll, Mary. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Letter to John S. Quarterman. Suwannee RIVERKEEPER and WWALS Watershed Coalition, Inc. "FOIA No. FY21-04: Response letter." December 8, 2020 at 1; New Fortress Energy. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Form 10-K. Commission File No. 001-38790. FY ended December 31, 2020 at 5.
- ¹³ NASEM at 10; Vantuono (2017) at 1 to 4.
- ¹⁴ Englund, Will. "Trump administration moving to allow railroads to haul liquefied natural gas. Opponents say it's a risk." *Washington Post*. March 3, 2020; NASEM (2021) at vi and 1.
- ¹⁵ Parfomak, Paul W. and John Frittelli. Congressional Research Service (CRS). "Rail Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas: Safety and Regulation." R46414. July 2020 at 1 to 3.
- ¹⁶ NASEM (2021) at 30.
- ¹⁷ Austen, Ian. "A runaway train explosion killed 47, but deadly cargo still rides the rails." *New York Times*. July 16, 2019.
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