ISSUE 1 (5) 2014 ISSN 2299-4335 P a Pa a Pa y Sy C y Edited by Maria Wincławska THE COPERNICUS JOURNAL OF POLITICAL STUDIES www.copernicusjournal.com ADVISORY BOARD Roman Bäcker (Toruń, Poland), Ryszard Borowicz (Toruń, Poland), José João Abrantes (Lisbon, Portugal), Bernhard Forhtner (Berlin, Germany), Mikheil Gogatishvili (Tbilisi, Georgia), Radosław Grabowski (Rzeszów, Poland), Piotr Grochmalski (Toruń, Poland), Miao Huashou (Beijing, China), Peter Jusko (Banská Bystrica, Slovakia), Jacek Knopek (Toruń, Poland), Richard J. Krickus (Washington, USA), Liu Jian (Beijing, China), Joanna Marszałek-Kawa (Toruń, Poland), Ralph Schattkowsky (Toruń, Poland), Witold Sobczak (Poznań, Poland), Konrad W. 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Lubicka 46, 87–100 Toruń, tel. 56 659 98 96 Content s INTRODUCTION Mar ia W in c ław sk a Political Parties and Party Systems in the Contemporary World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 ARTICLES O ni e l D ía z Ji m é n e z Party System Change in a New Democracy: he Case of Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Iz ab e la K a p s a British Party System Change. he Impact of Changing Voters, Devolution and Cabinet Coalition on the Two-Party System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 B eat a Ko s ow sk a - G ą sto ł External Factors Determining the Electoral Strategies of Political Parties in Multi-Level Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Ł uk a s z Kubi s z- M u ła Crisis Communication Tactics of Polish Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 K ar ina Ko siara - Pe d e r s e n he Impact of Having Children on Party Member Activism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Ewa Sk raba c z Polish Political Parties towards the Citizen Legislative Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 K at ar z y na S o b o l ew sk a - My ś lik , D o minik a K a s p r ow i c z he End of Party Representation? Some Remarks on the Relationships between Parties and Interest Organizations in Contemporary Poland . . . . . . . . . . . 116 4 Contents ANALISYS L u d ov ic Re nar d he Earthquake of the European Election in France. About Front National, French Party System and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 B ła żej Ch or o ś he New hird Party in Two-Party System? Circumstances and Implications of UKIP Success in 2014 European Parliament Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Ma x y m Koval ov he Armed Conlict in Eastern Ukraine: Exploring Competing Narratives . . . . . . 144 REVIEWS K at ar z y na G r z y b ow sk a -Wal e ck a (rev.) homas Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link. Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C. 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 M icha ł St r ze le c k i (rev.) Krzysztof Kowalczyk, Partie i ugrupowania parlamentarne wobec Kościoła katolickiego w latach 1989–2011 [Parties and Parliamentary Groupings towards the Catholic Church in Poland between 1989–2011], Szczecin 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 The Copernicus Journal of Political Studies 2014 No. 1 (5), pp. 144 –151 ISSN 2299- 4335 DOI 10.15804/cjps.2014.01.10 www.copernicusjournal.com Mak sy m Kovalov * 1 THE ARMED CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE: EXPLORING COMPETING NARRATIVES ABSTRACT How do we understand the armed conlict in Eastern Ukraine and what are its implications for Ukraine’s domestic politics as well as for stability in the region? he media, policymakers, and political analysts have used several competing narratives to explain the armed conlict in Eastern Ukraine. his paper examines three competing narratives of the armed conlict. he irst narrative focuses on domestic causes of the conlict; the second narrative examines the role of Russia in the insurgency; and the third narrative describes the conlict as a result of Western policies and interference. Key words Ukraine, armed conlict, domestic politics, Russia 1. The first narrative: domestic causes he irst narrative explains the armed conlict by focusing on domestic causes within Ukraine. his narrative is largely advocated by mainstream Russian media, Russian policymakers and some scholars. he Russian media have described the events in late 2013-early 2014 as a coup executed by extremist, neo-fascist groups. As early as in March 2014, Russian Foreign Afairs Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the radical right group “Right Sector” of challenging the public order using “the methods of terror and intimidation” (Kramer 2014). According to the oicial Kremlin position, by ousting a legitimately elected president, the * Maksym Kovalov, Department of Political Science, International Studies Program, College of Charleston, Charleston, SC, kovalovm@cofc.edu. The Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine: Exploring Competing Narratives 145 junta government efectively brought a breakdown of democracy in Ukraine (Judah 2014). Vladimir Putin also placed the blame on the extremists in Kyiv who were backed by the US government (BBC News). he oicial Kremlin position received wide acceptance among ordinary Russians. According to the Levada Center’s polls conducted in March 2014, more than 2/3 of Russians subscribed to this narrative. Russian respondents were also persuaded that their government had to protect ethnic Russians and had a right to interfere in Ukraine (Levada Center Report, 2014). A number of Russian independent media sources held a diferent view on the crisis but their voice remains largely unheard, because Russian citizens receive their news primarily from the state-controlled media. Scholarly explanations provide a more nuanced and detailed account of the primacy of domestic causes in Ukraine’s armed conlict. For instance, political scientist Serhiy Kudelia has argued that structural factors, found at the domestic level, account for the armed conlict (Kudelia, 2014). Kudelia suggests that the separatist movement originally emerged as a response to revolution and the regime change in Kyiv. he central authority and state capacity were efectively undermined by “self-defense” units which at irst emerged in western and central regions and later were created in eastern regions. Just as their western counterparts did months before, the eastern “self-defense” units challenged the newly created government in Kyiv, which according to many residents in the East, had questionable legitimacy. Popular public support for the separatist movement – between a quarter to a third of the Donbas residents showed solidarity with the rebels – is another factor showing domestic origin of the crisis. In sum, Kudelia argues that domestic factors – the revolutionary overthrow of central government in Kyiv, the presence of local groups with strong grievances which had a sizable support among the population, along with weak and fragmented state – are central to understand the origins of the armed conlict in eastern Ukraine (Kudelia, 2014). Another factor supporting the domestic narrative is the variation of separatist success across eastern regions. he separatist movement emerged in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but not in other Eastern regions. It seems that Donetsk and Luhansk became what Leon Trotsky described as “the least-barricaded gate” – areas where the state failed, the political system collapsed, and the rule of law was undermined (Paxton 2004). Meanwhile, other Eastern Ukrainian regions remained resilient facing the separatist challenge. If we assume that Donetsk and Luhansk were targeted by Russia (see the second narrative), it is diicult to use similar logic to explain a non-emergence of separatist movements in neighboring 146 Mak s y m Kovalov regions, for instance, in Kharkiv. Developments at the domestic level – actions by citizens and political elites – should account for this variation. Kharkiv was ripe to become the separatist center. he proportion of Russianspeakers in Kharkiv is comparable to that in Donbas and the pro-Russian sentiment was as strong. here was no deicit of pro-Russian groups who actively mobilized and advocated against the new government in Kyiv. Yet, these groups failed to reach a critical mass, and domestic grievances in Kharkiv did not translate into armed resistance. Political elites who initially supported the separatists but later advocated against them also played an important part preventing the armed conlict (Caroll, 2014). In sum, a series of factors found at the domestic level – the revolutionary events in Kyiv, the weakened state capacity, along with popular grievances – are used by supporters of the irst narrative to explain the emergence of the armed conlict. he citizens in Donetsk and Luhansk seem to have played an important role either by supporting the separatists or refusing to create strong opposition to them. On the other hand, political elites and citizens in neighboring regions united to protect the integrity and stability of their local institutions despite seemingly insurmountable challenges. 2. The second narrative: Russia-centric view he second narrative focuses on the role of external actors, suggesting that the armed conlict in Ukraine is a result of a covert Russian campaign that started with the annexation of Crimea. his narrative is prominent among western policymakers who have denounced the Russian incursion in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Vladimir Putin, as the argument goes, at minimum seeks to destabilize Ukraine and discredit its government. At maximum, the Russian president seeks to restart the process of gathering Russian lands and revive the idea of the Russian empire (Snyder, 2014). According to this view, Putin considers Ukraine and its people as merely a part of the Russian empire, rather than a sovereign nation state. Ukraine plays a central part in this plan, because, as Zbignew Brzezinski warned us in 1997, “Without Ukraine, Russia is a state. With Ukraine, Russia is an empire” (Brzezinski 1997). Max Fisher described the Russian campaign as a “stealth invasion” that started with supporting the separatist groups, arming them and then taking Russian soldiers into Ukraine’s territory. here is strong evidence gathered by Ukrainian and international observers conirming the movement of Russian troops crossing Ukrainian border as well as the movement of heavy weapons. The Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine: Exploring Competing Narratives 147 he evidence about the presence of Russian troops and weapons in Ukraine is also presented by the Russian opposition media. Novaya Gazeta reported on rebel groups composed of Russian citizens who in the past had fought in Chechnya and Afghanistan (Alfred 2014). Personal interviews with relatives of Russian soldiers reveal that signiicant numbers of troops were sent to Ukraine in early August, ater the Ukrainian army made signiicant progress in retaking the territory from the rebels (Petlianova, 2014). he prominence of Russian citizens among the rebels suggests that Russian special forces were in direct command of the military operation in Ukraine. he list of the rebel top-commanders included Alexander Borodai, Igor Girkin, Igor Bezler, and Alexander Khodakovsky – all Russian citizens. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin has denied the presence of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine. Faced with uncomfortable questions about the role of the military, the Russian President suggested that Russian soldiers volunteered in Ukraine while on vacation (Macfarquhar & Kramer, 2014). Putin’s explanations are not very credible, given his previous record of denial of presence of Russian troops during the annexation of Crimea (Lally 2014). In sum, the Russia-centric narrative suggests that Russia engaged in a modern type of warfare through limited military action, strong domestic media support and political muscle. he goals of Russia’s engagement have been a source of disagreement and debate. Timothy Garton Ash explains Russian incursion by Putin’s “völkisch version of the ‘responsibility to protect’” (Ash 2014), whereas Angela Merkel has questioned the rationality of the Russian president by saying that Putin lives “in another world.” (Traynor 2014). Regardless of Putin’s motivations, Russia played a central role in creating the armed conlict in eastern Ukraine by supplying the troops and weapons and providing political support to the rebels. 3. The third narrative: Western fault he third narrative is advocated by several Western scholars such as Stephen Cohen and John Mearsheimer. Both place responsibility for Ukraine’s crisis on the West. It is the US and the EU who share most of the responsibility for the Euro Maidan, annexation of Crimea, and violence in the East. According to this view, the source of the crisis originates in the 1990s with the expansion of NATO and the European Union, and the integration of the Baltic States into Euro-Atlantic institutions. he “color revolutions” in post-Soviet states are viewed by Russia as projects of Western governments who seek to undermine Russian inluence 148 Mak s y m Kovalov in the post-Soviet areas. his narrative suggests that the US and the EU should respect Russia’s strategic economic, political and security interests in post-Soviet space and essentially stay out of its “sphere of inluence.” According to John Mearsheimer, the recent overthrow of the democratically elected president via a violent coup was the inal straw for Putin who sees Western governments interfering into Russia’s “sphere of inluence” (Mearsheimer 2014). He portrays Western engagement in Ukraine as an attempt to turn the latter into a stronghold of the US and the EU. Mearsheimer blames the European Union for launching Eastern Partnership Initiatives to integrate post-communist economies into the EU and the United States for promoting democratic values and institutions in post-Soviet states. hese initiatives, according to Mearsheimer, create a threat for the Russian state because they question the authoritarian legitimacy of the Putin’s rule and may bring its demise. Similarly, Stephen Cohen places the responsibility on NATO’s expansion directly on the US president. Barack Obama, according to Cohen, announced the new Cold War threatening to put Russia and its president in a corner (Cohen 2014). He sees Putin’s annexation of Crimea and the support of the separatist rebels as simply a reaction to the western backing of the February coup. Mearsheimer and Cohen’s explanations of Moscow’s logic and behind the scenes intervention in Ukraine serves as an important theoretical example of the realist school of thought which, unfortunately, ignores the changes in international politics since the end of the Cold War. By emphasizing that Ukraine was pushed too hard by Western countries, thus alienating Russia and provoking its response, these scholars assume the excusive relevance of great powers in global politics and the insigniicance of smaller states. In other words, for Mearsheimer and Cohen, what matters most is what the Kremlin thinks about Ukraine, rather than what Ukraine, as a sovereign nation state, wants. hey downplay the fact that the majority of Ukrainians show higher support for integration with the European Union than for political union with Russia1. 1 he level of support for the European Union increased among Ukrainians from 43.7% to 50.5% between October 2011 and May 2014. Meanwhile, the share of those who favor integration with the Customs Union and Russia declined from 30.5% to 21.4% during the same time frame. Source: Razumkov Center, available at http://www.razumkov. org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=865, accessed on October 13, 2014. The Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine: Exploring Competing Narratives 149 hese “realist” views were highly prominent during the Cold War decades because they could explain international relations in a parsimonious way but, as Susan Strange reminded us two decades ago, “the world has changed” (Strange 1994). If we suggest that the problem lies in Western goals to westernize Ukraine, we may as well stick to the Hobbesian worldview in that “the strong do as they can and the weak sufer what they must” (hucydides, he Melian Dialogue). 4. Where do we go from here? If we assume the plausibility of domestic causes as the primary drivers of the armed conlict, the Ukrainian central government holds the keys to conlict resolution. he withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the east, engagement in negotiations with rebels and granting the regions greater autonomy may help release the tension. Alexander Motyl has suggested a more radical solution – instead of more autonomy to eastern regions, the Kyiv government should ofer them full independence (Motyl 2014). If we subscribe to the Russia-centric narrative, the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Ukrainian border is necessary for moving forward. he Russian authorities insisted on delegating more autonomous rights to Ukrainian regions. Based on the agreement signed in September 2014 by Presidents Poroshenko and Putin, the Ukrainian government is willing to grant more autonomy to the east. Finally, based on the third narrative, which assigns the responsibility to the West, we need to seek solutions in US and EU policies. his perspective advocates turning Ukraine into a neutral “bufer zone” and urges the US and the EU to stop any attempts to interfere in the country. Whichever narrative we adopt, the continuation of the armed conlict is in no one’s interest. Russia has been hit hard by economic sanctions and low oil prices and will have to deal with economic downturn and possible domestic instability. It will need to demonstrate its willingness to engage in negotiations with Ukraine’s new government and avoid further destabilization in the east. Ukraine needs to focus on economic recovery and political healing. Finally, Europe does not need another conlict zone at its doorstep. It is essential to recognize that the territorial integrity of Ukraine has been challenged and the status quo no longer remains a viable option. 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