



## **Illinois African Americans for Equitable Redistricting**

October 8, 2021

Hon. Kristen Clarke  
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Civil Rights Division  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Main  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Assistant Attorney General Clarke:

We, the undersigned, are members of the leadership team of Illinois African Americans for Equitable Redistricting, an ad hoc group that has come together to provide education and advocacy related to the 2021 redistricting process in the State of Illinois. Our members consist of registered voters, nonprofit leaders, coalitions and associations, business leaders, block leaders, and clergy members. We have hosted educational town hall meetings, participated in press conferences, drafted, and co-signed press releases, and participated in the legislative redistricting process through oral and written testimony for the Illinois House and Senate Redistricting Committees.

We are writing to ask you to conduct an expedited investigation into the policies and practices that have led to

- a Legislative Redistricting Plan that infringes upon the voting rights of Black voters in Illinois through retrogression and dilution
- the diversion of over \$800 million per decennial from Black communities to prison towns around the state through prison gerrymandering
- the subsequent filing of a lawsuit by MALDEF and the Republican Party of Illinois against legislative leaders of the Democratic Party and the Illinois State Board of Elections. This litigation is pending in U.S. District Court and is expected to be completed by mid-December 2021.

Ironically, these conditions are present at a time when Black leaders occupy some of the most influential offices in the State of Illinois, including Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Speaker of the House, Chairperson of the Democratic Party of Illinois, Vice Chairperson of the Senate Redistricting Committee and Vice Chairperson of the House Redistricting Committee. The Illinois Legislative Black Caucus boasts of its largest and arguably, most powerful, contingent in the State's history.

4111 West 21<sup>st</sup> Place  
Chicago, IL 60623  
773-571-3886

We have provided more detailed information on the following pages for your review. If you have any questions, please contact Valerie F. Leonard, Convener, Illinois African Americans for Equitable Redistricting at 773-571-3886 or [valeriefleonard@msn.com](mailto:valeriefleonard@msn.com). Your assistance is most appreciated.

Sincerely,

*Valerie F. Leonard*

Valerie F. Leonard  
Convener

*Norman Montgomery*

Norman Montgomery  
Co-Convener

*Zina Simmons*

Zina Simmons  
Co-Convener

## Background

The state of Illinois has recently enacted the most retrogressive redistricting plan in the State of Illinois' history. The number of majority Black representative districts have been cut from 16 in 2011, to 8 in 2021. The number of Black senate districts has been cut from 8 to 4. These are the lowest numbers of majority Black districts since 1980. The Democrats have effectively set Black voters back 40 years. This, despite having a Progressive White Governor and Senate President and a Black Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Chairperson of the Democratic Party of Illinois, Speaker of the House, Vice Chairperson of the Senate Redistricting Committee and Vice Chairperson of the House Redistricting Committee. The Illinois Legislative Black Caucus is the largest it has ever been, and arguably, the most powerful it has ever been.

It should be noted that Black people comprised 14% of Illinois' population in 2011, and we still comprise 14% of Illinois' population in 2021. Yet, the number of majority Black districts has been cut by 50%. White people comprised 60% of Illinois' population in 2011, and 58% of Illinois' population in 2021. Yet, 69% of the districts drawn in the redistricting plan, are majority White. In fact, two new majority White representative districts were formed by dismantling a majority Black district in East St. Louis, Illinois.

Some legislative districts that were historically Black, have been re-drawn to be majority Minority, when there were opportunities to draw these districts in a manner that retained or restored their historic majority Black status, pursuant to the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. Adding insult to injury, some of these historically Black Districts had their descriptions changed to de-emphasize the low-income Black communities while emphasizing more affluent White communities, even though the most affluent White communities comprise less than 10% of the land mass of the districts.

While IAAFER is a nonpartisan group that includes Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, it should be noted that 80% of Black Illinois voters identify as Democrat (Pew Research Center). Black voters are the most loyal segment of voters in the Democratic Party.

Ironically, the current Illinois Attorney General served as the Senate Redistricting Committee Chair in 2011, when the State of Illinois passed the most diverse redistricting plan in history, optimizing opportunities for Blacks, Latinos and Asians to elect candidates of choice. He will be defending the Illinois State Board of Elections in a lawsuit brought by Republicans and MALDEF, citing Voting Rights claims, among other things.

## Illinois Constitutional Redistricting Calendar

The Illinois State Constitution outlines the following Redistricting Calendar. As a result of the late release of Apportionment and related Census data, and the fact that the Illinois Constitution is silent on which data sets should be used to develop a Redistricting Plan, the Legislature opted to maintain the schedule, using ACS data. Waiting for the final Census numbers would have delayed the redistricting process beyond the June 30<sup>th</sup> deadline, triggering the creation of a bi-partisan Redistricting Commission to draw the map. Because the Commission's membership is 50-50 Republican and Democrat, historically, the Commission ends up deadlocked, and an additional member is brought on board to eventually break the tie. The Democrats, who control the process, did not want to take a chance on having a commission draw the maps, let alone, having a coin toss decide which party gets to select the additional member of the Commission in the event of a tie vote.

December 21, 2021	State Populations and congressional apportionment delivered to President. Illinois loses one of its Congressional Districts.
January 12, 2021	Inauguration of 102nd General Assembly
June 30, 2021	If no redistricting plan becomes effective by this date, a Legislative Redistricting Commission shall be constituted.
July 10, 2021	Deadline for formation of Redistricting Commission. The Commission shall consist of eight members, no more than four of whom shall be members of the same political party.
August 10, 2021	Deadline for Redistricting Commission to file an approved plan with the Secretary of State approved by at least five members.
September 1, 2021	If the Redistricting Commission fails to file an approved plan, the Supreme Court shall submit the names of two persons, not of the same political party, to the Secretary of State no later than this date.
September 5, 2021	No later than this date the Secretary of State shall draw by random selection the name of one of the two persons to serve as the ninth member of the Commission.
October 5, 2021	Last day for Redistricting Commission to file a redistricting plan with the Secretary of State approved by at least five members.

## MALDEF/Republican Lawsuit

MALDEF has filed a lawsuit on behalf of the Latino community, claiming that the maps are unconstitutional because they were prepared using ACS data. They argued that the use of ACS data would lead to malapportionment, and subsequently, the violation of the One Man, One Vote principle. They also alleged that the redistricting plan led to the dilution of the Latino vote. The Republicans voiced concerns of minority voters not being able to elect candidates of choice, citing the Black Voter dilution in East St. Louis as part of their case. However, their main suit calls the current maps unconstitutional because they rely on ACS data. The Democrats have amended the redistricting plan to address the concerns raised by MALDEF and the Republicans. A court hearing was held on October 7<sup>th</sup> to discuss amended complaints for a trial starting in November and wrapping up in December.

## The Issues

### The Amended Redistricting Plan Addressed Deficiencies At the Expense of Black Voters

The amended redistricting plan was apparently prepared considering official Census data and concerns outlined in lawsuits filed by MALDEF and Illinois Republican Party leaders. A cursory review of the data tables supporting the amended maps suggest that the problem of malapportionment has been mitigated, reducing the variance in district sizes across the board. The number of majority Latino districts increased from 10 provided in June to 13 provided under the current plan. Also, some Republican incumbents were reportedly spared from the prospect of running against other incumbents from their own party. Most importantly, the redistricting plan is based on actual Census data and not ACS data.

Unfortunately, these changes come at the expense of African American voters, with retrogression being one of the main issues. The table below shows the trends in the number of Black districts between 2011 and 2021.

State of Illinois Redistricting Plan					
Number of Black Districts	Enacted 2011	UCCRO 2021	State Reported	Actual State Enacted 2021	Amended State Enacted 2021
State Rep	16	18	15	12	8
Senate	8	9	7	6	4

In 2011, the redistricting plan was drawn with 16 majority Black Representative districts, and 8 majority Black Senate districts. This past spring UCCRO developed a redistricting proposal with 18 representative districts with 50% or more Black population. They also drew 9 Black Senate districts. Our elected representatives told us that their plan included 15 Black Representative districts and 7 Black Senate districts. We took them at their word, particularly since these figures were also included in a press release and news stories in several media outlets.

A recent review of the data that supports the maps enacted in June revealed that only 12 Black Representative districts and 6 Black Senate districts were drawn. The amended plan reduced the number of Black Representative districts from 12 to 8, and the number of Black Senate districts from 6 to 4. It should be noted that Black people made up 14% of Illinois population in 2011 and we make up 14% of the state's population in 2021. This—despite losing 3.7% population over the last ten years. The latest redistricting plan drew fewer than 7% of the new districts as majority Black. In summary, the latest redistricting plan reduces the number of majority Black districts by 50% in response to a drop in population of less than 4%. It should also be noted that the Black population is still clustered around those areas historically demarcated by bank redlining and restrictive covenants.

In terms of population loss, difference between 2010 and 2020 is a minus 49,035 or a 3.7% difference. In terms of representation, 2010 yielded 24 positions of representation, the current maps only yield 18 positions of representation. A 3.7% reduction in population does not justify a 50% loss of representation.

In contrast, the White population was 60% in 2011 and is 58% today. Even though Whites have experienced a larger population loss than Blacks, the new redistricting plan still allows for majority White districts to be drawn at a greater percentage than their relative population would suggest. For example, 41 of 59 Senate districts—or 69%--are drawn majority White.

Despite changing demographics and new Census data, it was not necessary for the Legislature to draw a map that improves the lot of one minority group at the expense of another. The UCCRO Unity Map proposal optimized opportunity for ethnic, racial, and religious minority groups around the state to elect candidates of choice. The Legislature did not consider the proposal, even though it was drawn within the constraints of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Illinois Voting Rights Act of 2011 and other state and federal laws.

## **Black Voter Dilution**

### ***The Illinois House Made a Concerted Effort to Draw As Few Majority Black Districts As Possible.***

Outlined in Table 1 on the following page are data supporting a mapping proposal for Illinois representative districts, in progress, compared to the enacted Illinois House Redistricting plan. The data suggest that, potentially, 17 majority Black representative districts could have been drawn within the 10% deviation allowed by the Voting Rights Act and Illinois State Code. As of this writing, an additional district, District 29, was drawn with a 7% deviation, and is being modified so that it has a deviation of no more than +/- 5%. (See below.) It should be noted that, although we requested that some Historic Black districts be drawn smaller so that the Black majorities could be maintained or restored, our requests were ignored. The Illinois House districts were drawn with negligible deviations, which, when rounded to the nearest tenth, are zero.

**Table 1.**  
**Number of Black Representative Districts Identified By IAAFER Versus the Number of Black Districts Drawn By the Illinois Legislature**

	IAAFER		Illinois House	
	Percentage Black	Deviation	Percentage Black	Deviation
District 5	54%	-4%	55.10%	0%
District 6	54%	-1%	45.44%	0%
District 8	59%	-2%	48.37%	0%
District 9	53%	-1%	45.04%	0%
District 10	54%	-2%	41.68%	0%
District 25	55%	+1%	54.23%	0%
District 26	56%	+1%	49.80%	0%
District 27	54%	-3%	52.27%	0%
District 28	54%	-2%	45.39%	0%
District 29	53%	-7%	58.30%	0%
District 30	54%	0%	51.08%	0%
District 31	55%	-2%	51.33%	0%
District 32	54%	+1%	48.60%	0%
District 33	53%	-1%	61.49%	0%
District 34	54%	+3%	66.92%	0%
District 38	53%	-4%	47.74%	0%
District 80	53%	-3%	26.45%	0%
District 114	52%	-2%	34.65%	0%
	<b>16 Black Districts</b>		<b>8 Black Districts</b>	

Apparently, when given a choice between drawing a district majority Black or majority Minority, the Illinois Legislature drew majority Minority districts, effectively diluting the Black Vote. This occurred with District 6, District 8, District, District 9, District 10, District 28, District 32, and District 38. The data suggest that District 80 and District 114 could have been drawn majority Black but were drawn majority White.

Each of the following districts were drawn as majority Black in 2011. Despite shifts in Black population over the last 10 years, each district could have been drawn as majority Black in 2021. Outlined below are Black percentages of total voting age population of the districts drawn in May 2021 using ACS data as compared to August 2021 using Census data. Fifteen of 16 majority Black House Districts were drawn more diverse in August than they were in June. The data suggest that, even though there were significant shifts in Black population, these districts could still have been drawn as majority Black. This is the case for every majority Black district drawn in 2011, except House District 34, which was drawn with a higher concentration of Black voters, going from 64.8% in May to 68.77% in August.

**Table 2.A**  
**Comparison Black Population Percentages of Total Population Depicted**  
**In Illinois House Districts Between May 2021 and August 2021**

House District 5 went from 51.7 to 51.13 black.
House District 6 went from 54.9 to 45.37 black.
House District 7 went from 47.6 to 42.33 black.
House District 8 went from 53.5 to 49.51 black.
House District 9 went from 45.8 to 40.54 black.
House District 10 went from 42.4 to 38.96 black.
House District 25 went from 56.7 to 53.63 black.
House District 26 went from 50.1 to 46.08 black
House District 27 went from 54.0 to 51.82 black
House District 28 went from 50.0 to 45.4 black
House District 29 went from 58.0 to 57.12 black
House District 30 went from 57.5 to 51.17 black
House District 31 went from 56.9 to 51.92 black
House District 32 went from 57.7 to 50.46 black
House District 33 went from 64.3 to 62.35 black
House District 34 went from 64.8 to 68.87 black

**Table 2B.**  
**Black Population Percentages of Total Population Depicted**  
**In Illinois Senate Districts August 2021**

Senate District 4 is now coalition B-47 W-29 H-21
Senate District 5 is now coalition B-46 W-34 H-11 A-9
Senate District 13 is 53% black
Senate District 14 is 51% black
Senate District 15 is 57% black
Senate District 16 is 52% black
Senate District 17 is 67% black
Senate District 3 is 53% black



## **Inaccurate Data**

After revisiting the data that we shared in Table 2, our first concern is that the "math" does not add up. There appear to be inconsistencies between the House map and the Senate map percentages. Senate and House Districts were drawn with approximately 0% deviation, meaning, every district is of approximately equal size. The Senate Districts are comprised of 2 nested Representative Districts. Senate District 5, comprised of Representative District 9 and Representative District 10 were drawn with Voting Age Populations of 40.54% Black and 38.96 Black, respectively. Based on the foregoing, one would expect Senate District 5 to be approximately 39.75% Black. However, the data behind the Senate's Amended Redistricting Plan indicates that Senate District 5 is 46% Black. This is but one example of several instances. We are concerned about the accuracy of the data and calculations that support the maps that will drive representation and community resources over the next 10 years.

## **Retrogression**

Retrogression is of significant concern. The history of minority representation in Illinois began in 1912 with one District. It is hard-fought through the 1980s with the Court adding a Senate District and two Representative Districts, increasing the number of minority districts to 10 majority Black Representative Districts and 5 Black Senate Districts. The 1990s brought one more minority representative and got the number to 6 Senate Districts and 12 Representative Districts. It was not until 2010 that progress was made in redistricting, and 8 majority Black Senate Districts were established with the nested 16 majority Black Representative Districts. With the 2020 maps reducing majority Black Senate Districts back to 4 Senate Districts and 8 House Districts, it returns the community to 1970s levels. We consider this regressive and counterproductive.

We are also concerned about the loss of alignment between the percentages of population and representation. In 2010, we were 14.5 percent of the Illinois population, 13.55 percent of the representation in the Illinois senate, and 13.55 percent of the representation in the Illinois house. With these changes in 2020, we are 14.1 percent of the population, 10.1 percent of the senate, and 10.1 percent of the house representation. With the inability to get precise, consistent numbers from the committee charged with creating the map, we may be underestimating the impact of the changes and at risk of losing the districts awarded by the Court in 1983.

## **Using the Illinois Voting Rights Act of 2011 to Subvert the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965**

The Illinois Voting Rights Act of 2011 (Illinois VRA) was enacted to expand the ability of minority groups to elect candidates of their choice. The Illinois VRA provides for the creation of Crossover Districts, Influence Districts, Coalition Districts and Majority Minority Districts. Majority Minority Districts offer the greatest level of protection of preserving Minority voting rights. The Illinois Legislature can use any combination of these district types to achieve goals of protecting Minority Voting Rights. The data outlined in Table 1 and Table 2 indicate a pattern that suggests that when given a choice of creating a Majority Minority District or creating one of the other types of districts, the Legislature opted not to create Majority Minority Districts in favor of creating other types of districts. Not only did this have the effect of diluting Black voting

strength, but it provides less protection for Black Voters over the long term. This is particularly true of Black Voters living in gentrifying areas, as in Senate District 5, which includes some of the poorest Black communities in the State of Illinois on the western end, and some of the State's wealthiest White communities on the eastern end.

## **The Illinois Redistricting Process Is Being Used For “Political Gentrification.”**

There seems to be a deliberate attempt to take and reduce the number of Majority Black Districts in selected areas. Historically, these are areas governed initially by restrictive real estate covenants and heavy red lines from financing institutions, leaving minimal opportunity for mobility. As a result, Blacks are more likely to live more clustered together in urban areas than any other racial or ethnic group. Several Historically Black legislative districts were drawn in a manner that reinforced the redline and restrictive real estate covenant boundaries. Without the shift in the lines, minority percentages within the areas would hold roughly the same if we had accurate data from the house.

Several Historically Black Representative Districts have been effectively “displaced” in favor of Majority Minority Districts or eliminated altogether in favor of Majority White Districts. The effect has been to dilute Black voting strength in communities undergoing gentrification pressure. Senate District 5 in Chicago is a prime example of an Historically Black Legislative District that was drawn as a Majority Minority District when the data suggests that it is possible to draw the district as Majority Black. Representative District 114 in East St. Louis could have been drawn with a Black majority of 50%. Instead, it was drawn with a Black minority of 34.65%.

We are also concerned about the significant changes in some descriptions of historically majority-Black districts found in the accompanying resolution for the redistricting plan between 2011 and 2021. We will use Representative Districts 9 and 10 for examples. These districts have been drawn to be majority Black districts for the 40 years prior to the 2021 Census. An estimated 85%-90% of their land mass is on Chicago's West Side, with significant portions in communities like North Lawndale, East Garfield, West Garfield, West Haven, and the Near West Side. This was the case in 2011 and remains the case today.

When the districts were drawn in 2011, they were drawn as majority Black. When they were described in 2011, the descriptions mentioned the existence of low-income Black communities, and listed the communities with the greatest land mass and percentage populations first. These included communities like North Lawndale and East and West Garfield and Humboldt Park. The more affluent White communities were listed last, presumably because their land mass as a percentage of the districts was relatively small, and the White population was in the minority.

Today, these districts were drawn with Black pluralities. This, although we have been able to prove that these districts may be drawn as majority Black, pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Illinois State Code. The Legislature, through the accompanying resolution to the redistricting plan, indicated that it was not possible to draw these districts as majority Black, as has been done in the past. (The data suggest otherwise.) The district is majority minority, with Whites in the minority, and the most affluent Whites in a smaller minority. When the districts were described in 2021,

there was no mention of low-income Black communities. When the communities were listed, they were listed, with the most affluent White communities first. The poorest communities in the district were listed last, although they comprise the largest land mass in the district.

## **Polarized Voting**

According to *Thornburg v. Gingles* (the first Supreme Court case to interpret the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act incorporating the results test), racially polarized voting is the “evidentiary linchpin” of a vote dilution claim. A racial bloc voting analysis is required to determine if minorities vote cohesively and if whites bloc vote to defeat minority preferred candidates (two of the three preferred candidates (two of the three *Gingles* preconditions for establishing illegal vote dilution)).

### **State Senate Elections-Senate District 5**

A review of 2008 election returns in Senate District 5 suggests polarized voting. Senate District 5 was drawn Majority Black again in 2000, with precincts from Majority Black Wards, Latino Wards, White-Latino Coalition Wards and Majority White Wards. The three candidates were Senator Rickey Hendon, the then-incumbent who is Black. His opponents were Jonathan Singh Bedi, of Indian descent and Mary Sue Mertens, who is White. Senator Hendon won, with 62.34% of the vote. Mary Sue Mertens got 25.16% of the vote, while Jonathan Singh Bedi got 12.5% of the vote. A closer review of the Ward results indicates that, generally, Senator Hendon won in the Black and Latino wards, while Mary Sue Mertens carried the White wards. Detailed election results are found in Appendix 1.A.

Senate District 5 was drawn Majority Black again in 2011, with precincts from Majority Black Wards, Latino Wards, White-Latino Coalition Wards and Majority White Wards. In 2012, the two candidates were Senator Annazette Collins, the then-incumbent who is Black. Her opponent was Patricia Van-Pelt Watkins, who is also Black. Patricia Van Pelt won, with 53.5% of the vote. Annazette Collins got 46.5% of the vote. A closer review of the Ward results indicates that, although both candidates are Black, generally, Senator Collins won in the Black and Latino wards, while Patricia Van Pelt Watkins carried the White wards. Van Pelt Watkins prevailed and remained the incumbent. Detailed election results are found in Appendix 1.B.

Chicago and Illinois have a history of racially polarized voting that goes beyond state level races. We have shared examples from Chicago’s most recent Municipal Election and Cook County’s most recent State’s Attorney’s race. The results of the research from these races are instructive, as the same precincts serve as the building blocks for Chicago’s wards, Cook County’s districts and the State of Illinois’ representative and senate districts. If racially polarized voting is evident around the City of Chicago and County of Cook, there is a strong likelihood that racially polarized voting is occurring in Illinois’ state senate and representative districts that have land mass in Chicago and Cook County.

### **2019 Chicago Municipal Election**

Kumar Ramanathan, a researcher from Northwestern University’s Chicago Democracy Project, found that, despite the fact that Black candidates have been able to win citywide elections, Chicago politics has not transcended its old racial divisions. Using Chicago’s most recent Municipal Election (March, 2019) as an example, Ramanathan found that, although a Black woman was elected Mayor, generally speaking, Black candidates carried the City’s majority Black precincts; Hispanic candidates carried majority Hispanic precincts and White candidates carried majority White precincts. A more detailed analysis of the data is found in Ramanathan’s article, “How Did Chicago’s Segregated Neighborhoods Vote in the Mayoral Election?” (See Appendix 1.C)

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### **2020 Cook County States Attorney Election**

Ramanathan also examined the outcome of Cook County’s most recent race for States Attorney (March 2020), including the impact of race and segregation. The incumbent, who is Black, was challenged by 2 White men and a White woman. Although the incumbent won overall, the data suggest that Foxx ran strongest in predominantly Black precincts while receiving much less support in majority White precincts in Chicago and Cook County’s suburban areas. The White candidates tended to outperform Foxx in majority White precincts. A more detailed analysis of the election results are found in Appendix 1.D, “Breaking Down Kim Foxx’s Win in the 2020 Primary”.

## **The Redistricting Hearings**

The redistricting hearings did very little to accomplish the stated goal of gathering public input for drawing new legislative district maps.

- A significant number of our duly elected representatives were absent from several hearings. Members of the Illinois House Redistricting Committee complained that there were some hearings for which only 2 elected officials showed up. Other hearings had no one from the public in attendance. All hearings were sparsely attended.
- We learned that the Legislature is not subject to the Open Meetings Act, which requires 48 hours’ notice for special meetings. We also learned that the House Rules were suspended to allow for hearings to go on with 4 hours’ notice.
- When it came to the last two public hearings, members of the Rules Committee reportedly decided, by a voting margin of 3-2, not to post notices to the ilga.gov website. Instead, people who had attended hearings before were notified by email. It is important to note that these were the meetings in which the amended maps were shared with the public.
- It was extremely challenging to prepare detailed oral responses to the new maps, let alone provide written testimony complete with analyses and recommendations within the short timeframes, and having very little information about what was changed in the maps and the rationale.

- Several witnesses asked for 30 days to review the maps and give more reasoned input. Instead, the amended maps were approved within 48 hours of being “shared with the public”.
- Senior Counsel from a national public interest law firm with an expertise in Civil Rights provided written and oral testimony regarding the negative impact of the Legislature’s redistricting plan. Her input was ignored.
- Illinois African Americans for Equitable Redistricting’s concerns regarding inequitable representation and Black voter dilution were ignored
- Despite the foregoing, the Chairperson of the House Redistricting Committee was quoted in media stories as saying she was proud of the maps that were produced.

## Prison Gerrymandering

### *The Treatment of Prisoners in Census Count Has a Negative Impact on Black Communities Throughout the State of Illinois*

The Legislature has recently passed legislation to count prisoners from their last known addresses before coming to prison. However, the law won’t take effect until 2025, effectively kicking the can down the road 10 years. We would, therefore, need to live with the current system until the next Census count. Senate District 5 is more adversely impacted by this policy than any other Senate District in the State.

Carol Marin, of CBS Local, conducted a study of 2013 IDOC data and found that IDOC released over 30,000 prisoners. Over 12,000 came to Chicago. Five thousand, five hundred thirty-five (5,535), or 46% of Chicago’s returning prisoners, returned to zip codes with all or some land mass in Senate District 5 on Chicago’s West Side.

#### Zip Codes With The Highest Number of Returning Prisoners

Zip Code	Returning Prisoners
60608	1,570
60607	923
60624	779
60644	679
60651	616
60623	540
60621	428
	5,535

6 of the 10 Illinois Zip Codes with the most returning prisoners are on Chicago’s West Side, with all or some land mass in Senate District 5.

Source: CBS Local 2013

Under current Illinois law, incarcerated persons are not counted in the Census numbers of the community from which they originate, but in the populations of the towns in which they are incarcerated. As a result, the Census numbers in Chicago for African Americans is significantly undercounted, while the voting numbers in some Downstate communities are inflated by over 95%. (Prisoners of the Census) On top of that, representatives from the districts in which the prisoners are incarcerated have a history of voting against legislation that will enhance education, job training and rehabilitation of prisoners. In effect, prisoners have no representation, and this is a clear violation of the “one man, one vote”, guaranteed by our Constitution.

On the other hand, legislators from the prisoners’ originating communities tend to be the ones advocating for improved education and rehabilitation services for prisoners who are not counted in their districts’ population. Towns with prisons are receiving entitlement funds for Community Development Block Grants and Social Service Development Block Grants that benefit their communities, but not the prisoners. A cursory analysis of publicly available data suggests that over the next 10 years, over \$1.3 billion of Census-driven funding could go to prison towns around the state of Illinois, instead of going to prisoners’ hometowns. More than \$240 million of this will have been diverted from the West Side and Senate District 5. While Senate District 5 is the most impacted district in the State, other predominantly Black districts around the state are experiencing a similar dynamic.

When the prisoners return home their originating communities are the ones who must help them transition by providing housing, job training and other social services. Unfortunately, the originating communities don’t get their full share of funding because the prisoners were counted in the Downstate town’s Census statistics.

## **Failure to Conduct Vote Dilution Analysis**

Dr. Lisa Handley, PhD, of Frontier International Electoral Consulting, prepared a presentation, “Vote Dilution: Measuring Voting Patterns by Race/Ethnicity. She indicates that,

*According to Thornburg v. Gingles (the first Supreme Court case to interpret the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act incorporating the results test), racially polarized voting is the “evidentiary linchpin” of a vote dilution claim. A racial bloc voting analysis is required to determine if minorities vote cohesively and if whites bloc vote to defeat minority-preferred candidates (two of the three preferred candidates (two of the three Gingles preconditions for establishing illegal vote dilution).*

*Vote dilution analysis should be conducted by any state with a significant minority population (Section 2 applies to all states) to ensure that a proposed redistricting plan does not fragment submerge or redistricting plan does not fragment, submerge or unnecessarily pack a geographically concentrated minority population in violation of Section 2.*

To the best of our knowledge, the Illinois Legislature conducted no such analysis before preparing the most recent Redistricting Plan. The topic was certainly not on the agenda of public hearings for the plans. Instead, the Legislature hired a consultant as an expert witness at one of the public hearings on redistricting. The expert indicated that it’s not necessary for districts to be Majority

Minority for Minority candidates to win elections. The expert did not share any analysis. Nor were there any expert witnesses sharing opposing views so that the Legislature could examine alternative views. The Democrats, who oversee the maps, seemed to have been very supportive of the expert witness, while the Republicans asked more challenging questions. The expert witness made a point of citing President Barack Obama and Senator Tammy Duckworth as examples. His presentation was one-sided, guiding listeners toward a pre-determined conclusion—that drawing more diverse districts doesn't mean that minorities can't get elected in those districts. His discussion didn't touch on scenarios in which Minority candidates who don't have access to the deep pocket donors and political machinery were able to prevail against well-resourced candidates.

## **Lack of Policies and Procedures to Ensure Redistricting Equity**

We are fully aware of the brutally partisan nature of redistricting. However, minority voting rights should not be sacrificed in the attainment of political goals and objectives. Indeed, the Illinois Legislature enacted a redistricting plan in 2011 that optimized the voting rights of Blacks, Latinos and Asian Americans to elect candidates of choice while delivering the Democrats a veto-proof majority of 73-45. Rather than try to replicate this result, the Democrats have drawn a map that further expands their majority to 80-38 while encroaching on the voting rights of Black Illinoisans.

We sent a letter to Congresswoman Robin Kelly, Chairwoman of the Democratic Party of Illinois, sharing our concerns. We have asked that the Democratic Party work with all levels of government in Illinois to develop a set of policies that ensure racial equity in redistricting. These would include, but not be limited to

1. Studying the impact apportionment and data classification have on counting the Black and other minority communities. We have found in our data analysis that some of the classifications, for example, Black + (Black + any other race), can be somewhat confusing and ambiguous when it comes to accurately identifying and counting Black persons. There is a Black Only category and several other Black + other race categories.
2. Documenting and publicizing how the Black + categories are accounted for in the redistricting process. The State's methodologies for requesting racial data from the Census, and how they are delivered back to the State could have a significant impact on the way Black persons are reflected in the redistricting plans. In fact, certain methodologies could have the effect of diluting the population counts for Black persons and other minorities.
3. Counting prisoners in the Census from their hometowns, effective immediately, as opposed to 5 years from now
4. Allowing for deviations in population size for majority-minority districts. Such practices have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Voting Rights Act cases.
5. Expressly prohibiting redistricting plans that effectively dilute the voting strength of minority groups.
6. Expressly prohibiting the reduction of the number of majority minority districts from one Census cycle to the next, unless extenuating circumstances make it impossible
7. Describing majority minority districts in a manner that respects the history and culture of the minority communities in which most of the population resides.

We have not yet received a response.

## Our Request

We respectfully request the Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division conduct a thorough investigation of the policies and practices of the Illinois Legislature's redistricting process, with an eye towards ensuring that outcomes like we're experiencing in Illinois never happen again.

1. Encourage the State Legislature to include prisoners in the Census counts of their last known address, rather than in the prison towns in which they were incarcerated as of the last Census, effective immediately, rather than in 2025. Waiting until 2025 to effect the change in the way Illinois' prisoners are counted in the Census will have the same effect as waiting until the 2030 Census to make the change. As it is, most of the communities from which Black prisoners come, and return upon discharge, are under-resourced.
2. Ensure that the State's redistricting plan creates a number of Majority Black Representative and Senate Districts proportionate to our percentages of the Illinois population. Creating Majority-Minority Districts could also help reduce the potential for high partisan bias in the redistricting plan. (Brennan Center)
3. Review the Illinois Legislature's revised redistricting plan for compliance with all applicable laws, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The review should also include holding the State of Illinois accountable for developing a Redistricting Plan that returns optimal opportunities for Black people to elect candidates of choice.
4. Make sure that the Illinois Legislature is not effectively using the Illinois Voting Rights Act of 2011 to dilute voting strength of Black Voters. Encourage the Illinois Legislature to prioritize the utilization of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 over the utilization of the Illinois Voting Rights Act of 2011 in drawing District boundaries.
5. Ensure that the revised redistricting plan restores the historic Black majorities in each of the Legislative Districts outlined in Table 1.
6. Encourage the State Legislature to develop redistricting goals, objectives, policies, and practices to develop legislative maps that yield optimum opportunity for Minorities to elect candidates of choice.
7. Encourage the Illinois Legislature to use all the tools that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 accords to create the optimal number of Majority Minority Districts, including allowing districts to deviate from the target population by +/- 5%.
8. Review the oral and written testimony provided by Illinois African Americans for Equitable Redistricting and other members of the public, as well as the UCCRO redistricting plan to ensure that the will of the people of Illinois is represented in whatever redistricting plan The Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division approves.
9. Share your findings with us, and to members of the general public as appropriate.



## **Appendix 1: Polarized Voting**

## **Appendix 1. A**

### **Election Results-Senate District 5**

### **Democratic Primary 2008**

The following pages include Democratic Primary Election results for Illinois' Senate District 5 in 2008. It should be noted that Chicago is overwhelmingly Democratic. In most cases, the elections are effectively decided during the Democratic Primary.

Senate District 5 was drawn Majority Black in 2000, with precincts from Majority Black Wards, Latino Wards, White-Latino Coalition Wards and Majority White Wards. The three candidates were Senator Rickey Hendon, the then-incumbent who is Black. His opponents were Jonathan Singh Bedi, of Indian descent and Mary Sue Mertens, who is White. Senator Hendon won, with 62.34% of the vote. Mary Sue Mertens got 25.16% of the vote, while Jonathan Singh Bedi got 12.5% of the vote. A closer review of the Ward results indicates that, generally, Senator Hendon won in the Black and Latino wards, while Mary Sue Mertens carried the White wards.

Chicago Board of Election Commissioners

2008 Primary - DEM - 2/5/08

State Senator, 5th

Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
39,532	24,644	62.34%	4,940	12.50%	9,948	25.16%

Ward 1 Latino, White

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
6	204	91	44.61%	22	10.78%	91	44.61%
8	171	55	32.16%	24	14.04%	92	53.80%
12	199	57	28.64%	26	13.07%	116	58.29%
31	125	21	16.80%	20	16.00%	84	67.20%
32	5	3	60.00%	0	0%	2	40.00%
35	93	28	30.11%	13	13.98%	52	55.91%
44	32	5	15.63%	7	21.88%	20	62.50%
<b>Total</b>	<b>829</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>31.36%</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>13.51%</b>	<b>457</b>	<b>55.13%</b>

Ward 2 Black Before Being Relocated to North Side

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
2	54	35	64.81%	5	9.26%	14	25.93%
3	276	125	45.29%	102	36.96%	49	17.75%

4	193	173	89.64%	9	4.66%	11	5.70%
5	293	233	79.52%	18	6.14%	42	14.33%
6	287	63	21.95%	49	17.07%	175	60.98%
9	230	166	72.17%	26	11.30%	38	16.52%
10	216	175	81.02%	17	7.87%	24	11.11%
12	254	56	22.05%	60	23.62%	138	54.33%
13	263	169	64.26%	27	10.27%	67	25.48%
15	130	112	86.15%	9	6.92%	9	6.92%
16	267	65	24.34%	86	32.21%	116	43.45%
17	201	156	77.61%	23	11.44%	22	10.95%
23	189	135	71.43%	19	10.05%	35	18.52%
25	324	193	59.57%	47	14.51%	84	25.93%
27	218	181	83.03%	18	8.26%	19	8.72%
28	125	40	32.00%	21	16.80%	64	51.20%
29	144	94	65.28%	19	13.19%	31	21.53%
32	125	88	70.40%	14	11.20%	23	18.40%
33	154	129	83.77%	9	5.84%	16	10.39%
34	258	211	81.78%	28	10.85%	19	7.36%
39	255	158	61.96%	25	9.80%	72	28.24%
41	129	105	81.40%	7	5.43%	17	13.18%
42	128	107	83.59%	9	7.03%	12	9.38%
45	243	168	69.14%	33	13.58%	42	17.28%
47	159	129	81.13%	11	6.92%	19	11.95%
48	196	168	85.71%	7	3.57%	21	10.71%

49	0	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
50	178	66	37.08%	13	7.30%	99	55.62%
51	217	164	75.58%	33	15.21%	20	9.22%
52	299	206	68.90%	37	12.37%	56	18.73%
56	259	191	73.75%	23	8.88%	45	17.37%
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,264</b>	<b>4061</b>	<b>64.83%</b>	<b>804</b>	<b>12.84%</b>	<b>1399</b>	<b>22.33%</b>

**Ward 11** White

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
50	3	2	66.67%	0	0%	1	33.33%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>66.67%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>33.33%</b>

Latino

**Ward 22** (Black Precincts)

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
7	227	176	77.53%	24	10.57%	27	11.89%
19	178	150	84.27%	8	4.49%	20	11.24%
21	212	176	83.02%	15	7.08%	21	9.91%
<b>Total</b>	<b>617</b>	<b>502</b>	<b>81.36%</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>7.62%</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>11.02%</b>

**Ward 24** Black

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
1	313	245	78.27%	29	9.27%	39	12.46%
2	169	114	67.46%	35	20.71%	20	11.83%

3	218	167	76.61%	28	12.84%	23	10.55%
4	224	193	86.16%	14	6.25%	17	7.59%
5	167	135	80.84%	10	5.99%	22	13.17%
6	253	175	69.17%	52	20.55%	26	10.28%
8	173	122	70.52%	31	17.92%	20	11.56%
9	223	170	76.23%	27	12.11%	26	11.66%
10	147	104	70.75%	19	12.93%	24	16.33%
11	139	92	66.19%	15	10.79%	32	23.02%
12	172	128	74.42%	19	11.05%	25	14.53%
13	207	155	74.88%	25	12.08%	27	13.04%
14	288	219	76.04%	30	10.42%	39	13.54%
15	178	138	77.53%	17	9.55%	23	12.92%
17	168	137	81.55%	14	8.33%	17	10.12%
18	143	102	71.33%	22	15.38%	19	13.29%
19	150	120	80.00%	11	7.33%	19	12.67%
20	194	164	84.54%	16	8.25%	14	7.22%
21	118	104	88.14%	6	5.08%	8	6.78%
22	191	145	75.92%	22	11.52%	24	12.57%
23	154	111	72.08%	15	9.74%	28	18.18%
24	93	74	79.57%	9	9.68%	10	10.75%
25	215	156	72.56%	36	16.74%	23	10.70%
26	275	216	78.55%	35	12.73%	24	8.73%
27	97	75	77.32%	11	11.34%	11	11.34%
28	230	187	81.30%	17	7.39%	26	11.30%

29	233	164	70.39%	36	15.45%	33	14.16%
30	191	153	80.10%	23	12.04%	15	7.85%
31	202	142	70.30%	29	14.36%	31	15.35%
32	176	134	76.14%	23	13.07%	19	10.80%
33	147	108	73.47%	27	18.37%	12	8.16%
34	207	145	70.05%	36	17.39%	26	12.56%
35	278	220	79.14%	20	7.19%	38	13.67%
36	165	129	78.18%	10	6.06%	26	15.76%
37	252	188	74.60%	32	12.70%	32	12.70%
38	210	145	69.05%	31	14.76%	34	16.19%
39	185	148	80.00%	16	8.65%	21	11.35%
40	241	167	69.29%	38	15.77%	36	14.94%
42	155	117	75.48%	20	12.90%	18	11.61%
43	273	230	84.25%	15	5.49%	28	10.26%
44	277	196	70.76%	41	14.80%	40	14.44%
45	177	138	77.97%	27	15.25%	12	6.78%
47	172	121	70.35%	23	13.37%	28	16.28%
48	118	89	75.42%	17	14.41%	12	10.17%
49	314	245	78.03%	30	9.55%	39	12.42%
50	334	256	76.65%	38	11.38%	40	11.98%
51	304	260	85.53%	23	7.57%	21	6.91%
52	168	142	84.52%	12	7.14%	14	8.33%
54	232	176	75.86%	28	12.07%	28	12.07%
55	211	160	75.83%	38	18.01%	13	6.16%

56	239	178	74.48%	31	12.97%	30	12.55%
<b>Total</b>	<b>10,360</b>	<b>7899</b>	<b>76.25%</b>	<b>1229</b>	<b>11.86%</b>	<b>1232</b>	<b>11.89%</b>

**Ward 25** Hispanic, White

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
3	191	117	61.26%	24	12.57%	50	26.18%
4	224	78	34.82%	38	16.96%	108	48.21%
6	138	47	34.06%	25	18.12%	66	47.83%
9	8	4	50.00%	2	25.00%	2	25.00%
10	120	67	55.83%	14	11.67%	39	32.50%
12	188	54	28.72%	35	18.62%	99	52.66%
18	75	41	54.67%	13	17.33%	21	28.00%
21	164	51	31.10%	33	20.12%	80	48.78%
25	160	45	28.13%	30	18.75%	85	53.13%
26	147	28	19.05%	36	24.49%	83	56.46%
27	161	52	32.30%	38	23.60%	71	44.10%
28	240	61	25.42%	66	27.50%	113	47.08%
29	347	148	42.65%	69	19.88%	130	37.46%
31	123	34	27.64%	20	16.26%	69	56.10%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,286</b>	<b>827</b>	<b>36.18%</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>19.38%</b>	<b>1016</b>	<b>44.44%</b>

**Ward 26** White, Hispanic

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
7	2	0	0%	0	0%	2	100.00%



17	65	30	46.15%	8	12.31%	27	41.54%
28	4	0	0%	0	0%	4	100.00%
32	19	8	42.11%	2	10.53%	9	47.37%
33	62	23	37.10%	11	17.74%	28	45.16%
46	150	64	42.67%	14	9.33%	72	48.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>41.39%</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>11.59%</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>47.02%</b>

**Ward 27** Black and Changing

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
1	185	42	22.70%	50	27.03%	93	50.27%
2	159	104	65.41%	30	18.87%	25	15.72%
3	210	180	85.71%	12	5.71%	18	8.57%
7	171	74	43.27%	40	23.39%	57	33.33%
8	193	168	87.05%	11	5.70%	14	7.25%
10	160	125	78.13%	15	9.38%	20	12.50%
11	205	99	48.29%	29	14.15%	77	37.56%
14	234	192	82.05%	14	5.98%	28	11.97%
15	131	107	81.68%	11	8.40%	13	9.92%
17	157	23	14.65%	53	33.76%	81	51.59%
18	136	37	27.21%	27	19.85%	72	52.94%
19	196	151	77.04%	20	10.20%	25	12.76%
22	194	169	87.11%	13	6.70%	12	6.19%
23	41	34	82.93%	5	12.20%	2	4.88%
24	187	160	85.56%	6	3.21%	21	11.23%

25	120	90	75.00%	12	10.00%	18	15.00%
26	183	146	79.78%	15	8.20%	22	12.02%
27	163	123	75.46%	15	9.20%	25	15.34%
29	158	132	83.54%	14	8.86%	12	7.59%
30	118	90	76.27%	10	8.47%	18	15.25%
31	140	111	79.29%	7	5.00%	22	15.71%
33	180	119	66.11%	22	12.22%	39	21.67%
34	174	147	84.48%	11	6.32%	16	9.20%
36	187	140	74.87%	14	7.49%	33	17.65%
40	172	144	83.72%	11	6.40%	17	9.88%
41	1	0	0%	1	100.00%	0	0%
44	157	125	79.62%	15	9.55%	17	10.83%
45	162	134	82.72%	11	6.79%	17	10.49%
46	207	176	85.02%	14	6.76%	17	8.21%
47	160	132	82.50%	12	7.50%	16	10.00%
48	217	187	86.18%	14	6.45%	16	7.37%
49	250	189	75.60%	23	9.20%	38	15.20%
50	197	55	27.92%	33	16.75%	109	55.33%
52	175	149	85.14%	8	4.57%	18	10.29%
53	148	70	47.30%	19	12.84%	59	39.86%
54	173	58	33.53%	29	16.76%	86	49.71%
55	172	142	82.56%	9	5.23%	21	12.21%
56	33	17	51.52%	2	6.06%	14	42.42%
57	121	48	39.67%	29	23.97%	44	36.36%

58	67	21	31.34%	13	19.40%	33	49.25%
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,394</b>	<b>4410</b>	<b>68.97%</b>	<b>699</b>	<b>10.93%</b>	<b>1285</b>	<b>20.10%</b>

**Ward 28** Black

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
2	243	195	80.25%	26	10.70%	22	9.05%
3	154	121	78.57%	10	6.49%	23	14.94%
5	184	141	76.63%	14	7.61%	29	15.76%
6	165	133	80.61%	19	11.52%	13	7.88%
7	180	128	71.11%	25	13.89%	27	15.00%
9	155	115	74.19%	19	12.26%	21	13.55%
10	62	55	88.71%	0	0%	7	11.29%
11	148	106	71.62%	26	17.57%	16	10.81%
13	98	77	78.57%	10	10.20%	11	11.22%
18	256	217	84.77%	19	7.42%	20	7.81%
20	226	189	83.63%	17	7.52%	20	8.85%
22	182	153	84.07%	8	4.40%	21	11.54%
23	174	138	79.31%	11	6.32%	25	14.37%
24	142	113	79.58%	14	9.86%	15	10.56%
25	129	103	79.84%	13	10.08%	13	10.08%
26	181	139	76.80%	20	11.05%	22	12.15%
28	126	86	68.25%	16	12.70%	24	19.05%
30	108	91	84.26%	5	4.63%	12	11.11%
31	179	142	79.33%	16	8.94%	21	11.73%

32	199	162	81.41%	15	7.54%	22	11.06%
33	198	145	73.23%	12	6.06%	41	20.71%
34	46	20	43.48%	11	23.91%	15	32.61%
35	175	150	85.71%	14	8.00%	11	6.29%
36	157	128	81.53%	12	7.64%	17	10.83%
37	269	228	84.76%	17	6.32%	24	8.92%
43	258	217	84.11%	12	4.65%	29	11.24%
44	203	173	85.22%	16	7.88%	14	6.90%
50	131	114	87.02%	6	4.58%	11	8.40%
52	153	115	75.16%	14	9.15%	24	15.69%
53	56	33	58.93%	6	10.71%	17	30.36%
54	158	134	84.81%	8	5.06%	16	10.13%
59	139	113	81.29%	11	7.91%	15	10.79%
61	108	69	63.89%	15	13.89%	24	22.22%
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,342</b>	<b>4243</b>	<b>79.43%</b>	<b>457</b>	<b>8.55%</b>	<b>642</b>	<b>12.02%</b>

**Ward 32** White

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
2	201	44	21.89%	32	15.92%	125	62.19%
4	232	31	13.36%	29	12.50%	172	74.14%
5	143	35	24.48%	19	13.29%	89	62.24%
6	212	73	34.43%	33	15.57%	106	50.00%
26	159	42	26.42%	28	17.61%	89	55.97%
29	120	31	25.83%	15	12.50%	74	61.67%

31	239	53	22.18%	28	11.72%	158	66.11%
33	124	30	24.19%	29	23.39%	65	52.42%
34	200	51	25.50%	26	13.00%	123	61.50%
35	218	49	22.48%	23	10.55%	146	66.97%
36	213	32	15.02%	38	17.84%	143	67.14%
37	1	1	100.00%	0	0%	0	0%
46	47	17	36.17%	5	10.64%	25	53.19%
50	12	2	16.67%	0	0%	10	83.33%
51	232	52	22.41%	28	12.07%	152	65.52%
52	119	19	15.97%	10	8.40%	90	75.63%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,472</b>	<b>562</b>	<b>22.73%</b>	<b>343</b>	<b>13.88%</b>	<b>1567</b>	<b>63.39%</b>

**Ward 37** Black

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
3	115	74	64.35%	14	12.17%	27	23.48%
4	308	229	74.35%	43	13.96%	36	11.69%
8	230	145	63.04%	55	23.91%	30	13.04%
12	167	121	72.46%	14	8.38%	32	19.16%
13	235	167	71.06%	29	12.34%	39	16.60%
28	247	174	70.45%	43	17.41%	30	12.15%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,302</b>	<b>910</b>	<b>69.89%</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>15.21%</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>14.90%</b>

**Ward 42** White

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
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9	94	24	25.53%	15	15.96%	55	58.51%
12	134	33	24.63%	12	8.96%	89	66.42%
14	186	52	27.96%	23	12.37%	111	59.68%
18	296	69	23.31%	63	21.28%	164	55.41%
21	137	29	21.17%	30	21.90%	78	56.93%
59	234	63	26.92%	46	19.66%	125	53.42%
67	312	78	25.00%	51	16.35%	183	58.65%
68	166	33	19.88%	35	21.08%	98	59.04%
69	173	47	27.17%	52	30.06%	74	42.77%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,732</b>	<b>428</b>	<b>24.71%</b>	<b>327</b>	<b>18.88%</b>	<b>977</b>	<b>56.41%</b>

**Ward 43** White

Precinct	Votes	Rickey R. Hendon	%	Jonathan Singh Bedi	%	Amy Sue Mertens	%
1	265	83	31.32%	52	19.62%	130	49.06%
3	217	44	20.28%	24	11.06%	149	68.66%
5	197	46	23.35%	24	12.18%	127	64.47%
9	174	44	25.29%	32	18.39%	98	56.32%
10	188	37	19.68%	39	20.74%	112	59.57%
11	142	25	17.61%	16	11.27%	101	71.13%
15	167	28	16.77%	25	14.97%	114	68.26%
47	171	51	29.82%	26	15.20%	94	54.97%
55	108	57	52.78%	8	7.41%	43	39.81%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,629</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>25.48%</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>15.10%</b>	<b>968</b>	<b>59.42%</b>

## **Appendix 1. B**

### **Election Results-Senate District 5**

### **Democratic Primary 2012**

The following pages include Democratic Primary Election results for Illinois' Senate District 5 in 2012. It should be noted that Chicago is overwhelmingly Democratic. In most cases, the elections are effectively decided during the Democratic Primary.

Senate District 5 was drawn Majority Black in 2011, with precincts from Majority Black Wards, Latino Wards, White-Latino Coalition Wards and Majority White Wards. The two candidates were Senator Annazette Collins, the then-incumbent who is Black. Her opponent was Patricia Van-Pelt Watkins, who is also Black. Patricia Van Pelt won, with 53.5% of the vote. Annazette Collins got 46.5% of the vote. A closer review of the Ward results indicates that, although both candidates are Black, generally, Senator Collins won in the Black and Latino wards, while Patricia Van Pelt Watkins carried the White wards. Van Pelt Watkins prevailed and remained the incumbent.

Chicago Board of Election Commissioners

2012 Primary - DEM - 3/20/12

State Senator, 5th District

Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
18,842	10,081	53.50%	8,761	46.50%

Ward 1 Latino, White

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
6	61	38	62.30%	23	37.70%
8	67	39	58.21%	28	41.79%
10	38	27	71.05%	11	28.95%
12	49	27	55.10%	22	44.90%
21	63	41	65.08%	22	34.92%
25	46	26	56.52%	20	43.48%
26	29	23	79.31%	6	20.69%
31	50	35	70.00%	15	30.00%
35	5	5	100.00%	0	0%
37	69	49	71.01%	20	28.99%
<b>Total</b>	<b>477</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>64.99%</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>35.01%</b>



**Ward 2** Black

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
2	17	14	82.35%	3	17.65%
3	96	47	48.96%	49	51.04%
4	98	58	59.18%	40	40.82%
5	110	56	50.91%	54	49.09%
6	71	53	74.65%	18	25.35%
9	94	59	62.77%	35	37.23%
10	104	51	49.04%	53	50.96%
12	83	51	61.45%	32	38.55%
13	152	90	59.21%	62	40.79%
15	61	24	39.34%	37	60.66%
16	75	55	73.33%	20	26.67%
17	96	57	59.38%	39	40.63%
23	87	45	51.72%	42	48.28%
25	113	70	61.95%	43	38.05%
27	114	39	34.21%	75	65.79%
28	50	34	68.00%	16	32.00%
29	70	40	57.14%	30	42.86%
32	39	21	53.85%	18	46.15%
33	51	27	52.94%	24	47.06%
34	138	61	44.20%	77	55.80%
39	95	57	60.00%	38	40.00%
41	42	22	52.38%	20	47.62%

42	104	38	36.54%	66	63.46%
45	122	64	52.46%	58	47.54%
47	168	57	33.93%	111	66.07%
48	121	58	47.93%	63	52.07%
50	60	45	75.00%	15	25.00%
51	68	37	54.41%	31	45.59%
52	164	70	42.68%	94	57.32%
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,663</b>	<b>1400</b>	<b>52.57%</b>	<b>1263</b>	<b>47.43%</b>

**Ward 22** Latino (Black Precincts)

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
7	115	58	50.43%	57	49.57%
19	57	20	35.09%	37	64.91%
21	118	45	38.14%	73	61.86%
<b>Total</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>42.41%</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>57.59%</b>

**Ward 24** Black

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
1	136	51	37.50%	85	62.50%
2	67	28	41.79%	39	58.21%
3	74	39	52.70%	35	47.30%
4	87	42	48.28%	45	51.72%
5	104	49	47.12%	55	52.88%
6	120	59	49.17%	61	50.83%

7	95	53	55.79%	42	44.21%
8	82	33	40.24%	49	59.76%
9	92	39	42.39%	53	57.61%
10	85	39	45.88%	46	54.12%
11	136	62	45.59%	74	54.41%
12	84	31	36.90%	53	63.10%
13	70	32	45.71%	38	54.29%
14	119	50	42.02%	69	57.98%
15	78	33	42.31%	45	57.69%
16	5	2	40.00%	3	60.00%
17	69	41	59.42%	28	40.58%
18	131	54	41.22%	77	58.78%
19	174	72	41.38%	102	58.62%
20	72	45	62.50%	27	37.50%
21	51	22	43.14%	29	56.86%
22	172	80	46.51%	92	53.49%
23	139	79	56.83%	60	43.17%
24	163	66	40.49%	97	59.51%
25	101	53	52.48%	48	47.52%
26	106	56	52.83%	50	47.17%
27	157	56	35.67%	101	64.33%
28	122	52	42.62%	70	57.38%
29	138	65	47.10%	73	52.90%
30	82	36	43.90%	46	56.10%

31	102	39	38.24%	63	61.76%
32	112	60	53.57%	52	46.43%
34	85	44	51.76%	41	48.24%
35	147	72	48.98%	75	51.02%
36	132	57	43.18%	75	56.82%
37	112	55	49.11%	57	50.89%
38	123	66	53.66%	57	46.34%
39	94	45	47.87%	49	52.13%
40	125	60	48.00%	65	52.00%
41	53	23	43.40%	30	56.60%
42	82	45	54.88%	37	45.12%
43	120	58	48.33%	62	51.67%
44	170	94	55.29%	76	44.71%
45	65	20	30.77%	45	69.23%
46	26	17	65.38%	9	34.62%
47	81	32	39.51%	49	60.49%
48	122	52	42.62%	70	57.38%
49	213	107	50.23%	106	49.77%
50	178	94	52.81%	84	47.19%
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,253</b>	<b>2459</b>	<b>46.81%</b>	<b>2794</b>	<b>53.19%</b>

**Ward 25** Latino, White

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
3	50	36	72.00%	14	28.00%
4	109	97	88.99%	12	11.01%
10	48	40	83.33%	8	16.67%
21	92	64	69.57%	28	30.43%
25	69	47	68.12%	22	31.88%
27	59	40	67.80%	19	32.20%
28	112	87	77.68%	25	22.32%
29	178	140	78.65%	38	21.35%
<b>Total</b>	<b>717</b>	<b>551</b>	<b>76.85%</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>23.15%</b>

**Ward 26** White

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
7	1	1	100.00%	0	0%
17	45	30	66.67%	15	33.33%
33	0	0	0%	0	0%
46	35	21	60.00%	14	40.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>64.20%</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>35.80%</b>

**Ward 27** Black And Changing

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
1	65	51	78.46%	14	21.54%
2	80	38	47.50%	42	52.50%

3	130	60	46.15%	70	53.85%
5	31	22	70.97%	9	29.03%
6	38	33	86.84%	5	13.16%
7	69	48	69.57%	21	30.43%
8	86	35	40.70%	51	59.30%
9	152	108	71.05%	44	28.95%
10	205	134	65.37%	71	34.63%
11	48	36	75.00%	12	25.00%
12	62	46	74.19%	16	25.81%
14	146	75	51.37%	71	48.63%
15	158	78	49.37%	80	50.63%
16	34	25	73.53%	9	26.47%
17	52	37	71.15%	15	28.85%
18	47	34	72.34%	13	27.66%
19	157	94	59.87%	63	40.13%
20	107	88	82.24%	19	17.76%
21	110	87	79.09%	23	20.91%
22	170	102	60.00%	68	40.00%
23	98	54	55.10%	44	44.90%
24	156	102	65.38%	54	34.62%
25	55	20	36.36%	35	63.64%
26	116	58	50.00%	58	50.00%
27	85	49	57.65%	36	42.35%
28	89	64	71.91%	25	28.09%

29	50	38	76.00%	12	24.00%
30	46	32	69.57%	14	30.43%
31	79	53	67.09%	26	32.91%
33	68	50	73.53%	18	26.47%
34	200	135	67.50%	65	32.50%
35	71	50	70.42%	21	29.58%
36	102	54	52.94%	48	47.06%
37	148	118	79.73%	30	20.27%
40	61	44	72.13%	17	27.87%
43	46	31	67.39%	15	32.61%
44	177	91	51.41%	86	48.59%
45	24	18	75.00%	6	25.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,618</b>	<b>2292</b>	<b>63.35%</b>	<b>1326</b>	<b>36.65%</b>

**Ward 28** Black

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
1	54	26	48.15%	28	51.85%
2	117	32	27.35%	85	72.65%
3	60	26	43.33%	34	56.67%
5	82	40	48.78%	42	51.22%
6	56	21	37.50%	35	62.50%
7	58	17	29.31%	41	70.69%
9	83	31	37.35%	52	62.65%
10	27	2	7.41%	25	92.59%

11	49	21	42.86%	28	57.14%
12	0	0	0%	0	0%
13	52	20	38.46%	32	61.54%
18	131	63	48.09%	68	51.91%
20	128	50	39.06%	78	60.94%
21	107	48	44.86%	59	55.14%
22	85	32	37.65%	53	62.35%
23	148	56	37.84%	92	62.16%
24	51	21	41.18%	30	58.82%
25	80	41	51.25%	39	48.75%
26	78	23	29.49%	55	70.51%
27	90	35	38.89%	55	61.11%
28	59	22	37.29%	37	62.71%
30	13	4	30.77%	9	69.23%
31	80	25	31.25%	55	68.75%
32	83	29	34.94%	54	65.06%
33	116	37	31.90%	79	68.10%
34	63	32	50.79%	31	49.21%
35	69	29	42.03%	40	57.97%
36	145	54	37.24%	91	62.76%
37	164	52	31.71%	112	68.29%
40	129	43	33.33%	86	66.67%
42	38	18	47.37%	20	52.63%
43	132	43	32.58%	89	67.42%



44	122	52	42.62%	70	57.38%
50	60	31	51.67%	29	48.33%
51	73	26	35.62%	47	64.38%
52	58	22	37.93%	36	62.07%
54	67	19	28.36%	48	71.64%
55	50	22	44.00%	28	56.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,057</b>	<b>1165</b>	<b>38.11%</b>	<b>1892</b>	<b>61.89%</b>

**Ward 32** White

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
2	87	60	68.97%	27	31.03%
4	103	81	78.64%	22	21.36%
5	48	33	68.75%	15	31.25%
6	75	49	65.33%	26	34.67%
14	55	36	65.45%	19	34.55%
26	60	35	58.33%	25	41.67%
28	38	23	60.53%	15	39.47%
29	52	34	65.38%	18	34.62%
31	80	61	76.25%	19	23.75%
33	45	25	55.56%	20	44.44%
34	48	33	68.75%	15	31.25%
35	68	52	76.47%	16	23.53%
36	73	55	75.34%	18	24.66%
46	23	13	56.52%	10	43.48%

51	72	56	77.78%	16	22.22%
52	32	26	81.25%	6	18.75%
<b>Total</b>	<b>959</b>	<b>672</b>	<b>70.07%</b>	<b>287</b>	<b>29.93%</b>

**Ward 37** Black

Precinct	Votes	Patricia Van Pelt Watkins	%	Annazette R. Collins	%
2	0	0	0%	0	0%
3	47	30	63.83%	17	36.17%
4	100	45	45.00%	55	55.00%
8	60	24	40.00%	36	60.00%
12	65	26	40.00%	39	60.00%
13	96	41	42.71%	55	57.29%
14	28	13	46.43%	15	53.57%
21	3	2	66.67%	1	33.33%
28	124	48	38.71%	76	61.29%
30	71	32	45.07%	39	54.93%
33	19	9	47.37%	10	52.63%
42	3	3	100.00%	0	0%
43	93	42	45.16%	51	54.84%
<b>Total</b>	<b>709</b>	<b>315</b>	<b>44.43%</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>55.57%</b>

**Ward 42** White

<b>Precinct</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Patricia Van Pelt Watkins</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Annazette R. Collins</b>	<b>%</b>
12	59	44	74.58%	15	25.42%
21	0	0	0%	0	0%
61	41	24	58.54%	17	41.46%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>68.00%</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>32.00%</b>

**Ward 43** White

<b>Precinct</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Patricia Van Pelt Watkins</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Annazette R. Collins</b>	<b>%</b>
1	107	78	72.90%	29	27.10%
3	85	72	84.71%	13	15.29%
5	59	45	76.27%	14	23.73%
7	40	28	70.00%	12	30.00%
9	63	41	65.08%	22	34.92%
10	66	46	69.70%	20	30.30%
11	59	39	66.10%	20	33.90%
15	66	50	75.76%	16	24.24%
19	96	64	66.67%	32	33.33%
25	77	57	74.03%	20	25.97%
37	80	64	80.00%	16	20.00%
51	120	90	75.00%	30	25.00%
<b>Total</b>	<b>918</b>	<b>674</b>	<b>73.42%</b>	<b>244</b>	<b>26.58%</b>

**Appendix 1.C**  
**“How Did Chicago’s Segregated Neighborhoods Vote in the  
Mayoral Election?”**

# How Did Chicago's Segregated Neighborhoods Vote in the Mayoral Election?

by [Kumar Ramanathan](#) | Mar 11, 2019 | Blog | 0 comments



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(Photo credit: [Ken Lund](#))

Is Chicago going post-racial? That question was hanging in the air on February 26, as the maps of the city's general election results began to circulate and showed two black women—Lori Lightfoot and Toni Preckwinkle—leading the crowded field. Early next month, Chicago will be the first American city of more than a million residents to have a black woman as its mayor. It will also have only its second black mayor in more than thirty-two years. How should we interpret and explain this historic result?

In particular, the candidates' apparent success on the city's North Side has drawn attention. Some commentators suggested that the election's historic outcome signals that voting patterns are no longer shaped by its racial segregation, at least in the white electorate. The *New York Times*' [election postmortem](#) declared "It Wasn't About Race," pointing to ward-level maps to observe that "Ms. Lightfoot and Ms. Preckwinkle appealed to mostly white communities" on the North

Side. *Chicago Tribune* [columnist Dahleen Glanton wrote that](#) “white people in Chicago decided that it was time to have an African-American female mayor. That has never happened in our city.” The Atlantic’s *CityLab* [noted that](#) “[w]hile Lightfoot and Preckwinkle may not have been most of black Chicago’s preferred representatives, they were the two most popular candidates in almost half of the whiter north.” *Chicago Magazine*’s Edward McClelland went so far as [to argue that](#) “[Lightfoot and Preckwinkle] are in the runoff because their campaigns transcended ethnic boundaries” and that the two candidates’ issue-based progressive agendas “may have changed Chicago politics permanently.” This would be a remarkable transformation in a city in which white wards overwhelmingly opposed the ascension of Harold Washington to office three decades ago, and have supported white candidates ever since (well, *two* white candidates—because Richard M. Daley and Rahm Emanuel together won the next 7 elections).<sup>1</sup> Four decades later, the city’s deep social inequalities and divisions have not gone away and Chicago continues to be [known for its racial segregation](#).

Despite some commentary that Chicago politics has transcended its old racial divisions, a closer look at precinct-level demographic data and voting patterns suggests that racial segregation continues to matter deeply in the city’s elections. The aforementioned commentaries are largely based on examining ward-level maps of the winning candidate in each region. Given the well-known pattern of racial segregation in Chicago, one can infer the rough relationship between race and vote choice. But these maps leave the story incomplete. After all, Chicago is not only segregated by region, but within its regions as well. Here, I take a closer look at the voting behavior of segregated neighborhoods by shifting the level of analysis from wards to election precincts. Since demographic data on the precinct-level is not readily available, the Chicago Democracy Project used data from the Census Bureau to estimate the racial composition of each precinct.<sup>2</sup> Using these estimates, I visualized the share of the votes that candidates won in precincts where over 50% of the population is non-Hispanic white, black, or Latinx.<sup>3</sup> A vast majority of the city’s electorate lives in these precincts: 32% of registered Chicago voters live in majority-black precincts, 35% in majority-white ones, and 19% in majority-Latinx ones. The visualizations below plot smoothed lines representing conditional averages of candidates’ vote shares against precinct racial composition.<sup>4</sup>




Figure 1

The precinct-level data underscores the extent of Willie Wilson’s support in the city’s most black neighborhoods, as shown in Figure 1, as shown in Figure 1. Toni Preckwinkle was the second most-favored candidate on average in majority-black precincts, with Lori Lightfoot coming in a distant third place. While support for Wilson and Preckwinkle increase along with precincts’ black population (sharply for Wilson and slightly for Preckwinkle), support for Lightfoot is roughly even over this range.





Figure 2

Figure 2 shows major candidates' vote shares in majority-Latinx precincts. Susana Mendoza outperformed all other candidates in these precincts by a considerable margin, with her support increasing in more homogeneously Latinx areas. Gery Chico also found his greatest support in such areas, although his average share of the vote was much lower than Mendoza's and relatively close to Bill Daley's. One reason that Mendoza's strong showing in Latinx neighborhoods did not translate to a larger total vote share is that voter turnout was lower in highly Latinx precincts (see [Figure 3, linked here](#)). This is not surprising given Mendoza's campaign did not seem to go beyond the ethnic cue phenomenon in efforts to attract more Latinx voters to the polls.





Credit: Chicago Democracy Project @ Northwestern University

Figure 4

Turning to the city’s white neighborhoods, we can examine more closely the claim that Chicago’s white voters elevated two black women candidates to the run-off election. As Figure 4 above shows, the story is more complicated than ward-level maps suggest. In the most homogeneously white precincts, two white men, Jerry Joyce and Bill Daley, emerged as victors. Joyce’s support is indeed highly concentrated in overwhelmingly white areas. Lori Lightfoot certainly performed well in majority-white precincts, winning on average 20 percent of the vote in very-white but not entirely-white precincts. In precincts that are 80% or more white, however, Lightfoot lost ground to Daley and Joyce. Toni Preckwinkle, on the other hand, loses support steadily as precincts become more white. In some of the whitest parts of the city, ninth-place finisher Paul Vallas outperformed Preckwinkle. In majority-white precincts, Lightfoot and Preckwinkle *combine*, on average, for 30 percent of the vote.<sup>5</sup> That’s more than Washington in ’83, but the claim that white Chicago chose Lightfoot and Preckwinkle as the finalists for mayor, then, seems only partially true at best.

Recalling the commentary on the election discussed earlier, we might suspect that it was white voters on the North Side in particular who were willing to vote for these two black women candidates. Figure 5 below shows the candidates’ vote share against estimated precinct white populations on the North Side alone (note that this graph plots *all* North Side precincts ranging from 0% to 100% white, not just those that are majority white).<sup>6</sup> Lori Lightfoot gets consistently high support

across the North Side, doing best in precincts between 50% and 75% white. Toni Preckwinkle’s North Side support, meanwhile, is more concentrated in the region’s *least white* areas. In the most homogeneously white North Side neighborhoods, Daley comes out on top.




Figure 5

The exception to Chicago’s historic pattern of white neighborhoods voting for white candidates in this cycle lies primarily in Lori Lightfoot’s performance on the North and Northwest sides (for a deeper analysis of the variation in Lightfoot and Preckwinkle’s bases, see [this post](#)). Indeed, Lightfoot performed considerably better in majority-white precincts than she did in majority-black or majority-Latinx precincts.<sup>7</sup> In the city’s black and Latinx neighborhoods, black and Latinx candidates continued to dominate. However, it should be noted that unlike white neighborhoods, these areas have been willing to support non-black and non-Latinx candidates in the past.

It remains to be seen whether Lightfoot’s strong showing in some of the city’s whiter neighborhoods will be followed by more non-white candidates doing well among white voters in future elections. Setting aside the racial identities of the candidates, the above analysis shows that Chicago’s racially segregated neighborhoods continued to evince sharply different voting patterns in February’s election. A run-off between two black women candidates who self-identify as progressives—and who need to mobilize supporters of a dozen other candidates—

may yet unsettle such patterns, but claims of Chicago politics having transcended racial segregation are overblown.

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### Footnotes

1. In some of the whitest wards in Washington's 1983 bid for office, [upwards of 95 percent](#) of voters supported a Republican rival with the notorious slogan "[Before it's too late.](#)" Even in the Bridgeport heart of the Democratic machine, nearly 3 in 4 votes went against the Democratic candidate.
2. We used 5-year estimates from the 2012-17 American Community Survey. Because Census geography and electoral precincts do not match, estimating precinct demography involve some data processing. To make these estimates, we collected ACS data for Block Groups (BGs) and used a GIS Intersect function to create a new terrain of block-group-precinct fragments across the city. The ACS count for each measure (eg. total population, or non-hispanic white persons) was divided among each BG's fragments according to its proportion of the BG's overall area. Then these proportionate counts were added up according to which precinct they were in, and the estimated percentages (eg. percent non-hispanic white) were created based these newly estimated precinct counts. The key underlying assumption of this procedure is that persons in the categories of interest are evenly distributed within the BG. Because BGs are small (less than half a square mile on average in Chicago), the error potentially introduced by this procedure is outweighed by the advantage of being able to compare election results to demographic characteristics.
3. Since only 14 precincts have an estimated majority Asian American population, generating a similar visualization for majority Asian American precincts would not yield tractable analyses. For those who are curious, of these 14 precincts, 10 are in the 11th ward, three are in the 25th ward, and one is in the 40th ward.
4. A loess regression is used to generate the smoothed conditional means lines. For more details, [see documentation here](#). Note that these visualizations do not account for differences in rates of registration and turnout across precincts. Analyses that do account for such variation show similar patterns.  
  
To see these analyses, please contact the author.
5. Note that this does *not* mean 30% of white voters chose one of these two candidates. We estimate that roughly 70% of voters in majority white precincts are non-Hispanic whites. The extent to which Lightfoot's support was located more unevenly among the white or non-white voters in each precinct is impossible to determine with the available data.

6. The following wards are classified as being on the North Side: 1, 2, 32, 40,

42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50.

7. Pooling all the votes in these groups of precincts, Lightfoot won 21.2% of the vote in majority-white precincts, 13.9% in majority-black ones, 11.7% in majority-Latinx ones, and 21.2% in precincts with no majority group. Daley and Preckwinkle won 19.1% and 12.2% of the vote in majority-white

precincts respectively.

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## [Kumar Ramanathan](#)

### [Kumar Ramanathan](#)

PhD candidate at Northwestern University

Kumar Ramanathan is a PhD student in Political Science at Northwestern University. His research explores how law and public policy shape racial and gender inequalities, focusing mainly on immigration policy, social policy, and criminal justice policy in the United States. He is interested in finding new ways to connect academic scholarship to public debates about law and policy. Kumar is from Hong Kong by way of Boston.

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
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**Appendix 1.D**  
**“Breaking Down Kim Foxx’s**  
**Win in the 2020 Primary”**

# Breaking Down Kim Foxx's Win in the 2020 Primary

by Kumar Ramanathan | Mar 25, 2020 | Analysis | 0 comments



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(co-authored with [Tom Ogorzalek](#))

*Note: This article was updated on April 10, 2020 to reflect finalized election results.*

Last week, in the shadow of the coronavirus pandemic, Illinois held its primary election. Voter turnout was down significantly from 2016, and the presidential nomination grabbed most of the headlines. But further down the ballot, Democratic voters also re-nominated incumbent Cook County State's Attorney Kim Foxx in a race closely watched by criminal justice reform advocates.<sup>1</sup> As the chief prosecutor of the county, the State's Attorney can dramatically affect the lives of individuals and communities. This election marked the first time that a member of a recent wave of pro-reform local prosecutors has been up for re-election in a major city, and served as a barometer for local political organizations and progressive prosecutors in big cities across the country.

## A Referendum on Progressive Prosecutors?

Kim Foxx rose to prominence when she challenged incumbent State's Attorney Anita Alvarez in the 2016 election. During that election, progressive activist groups mobilized against Alvarez, who was embroiled in controversy over her handling of the murder of Laquan McDonald, memorably creating the slogan #ByeAnita. Along with ousting a dissatisfying incumbent, these groups also sought to advance a broad criminal justice agenda through changing the policies of the county prosecutor's office. Foxx, a former Assistant State's Attorney and chief of staff for Cook County Board President Toni Preckwinkle, [ran on a platform of criminal justice reform](#) that promised to reduce incarceration levels and improve police accountability measures. Amid the ongoing controversy around Alvarez, the Cook County Democratic Party [reversed its initial decision](#) not to endorse in the race and threw its support behind Foxx. In the March 2016 primary election, Foxx won the three-way race comfortably with 58% of the vote. As expected in the heavily Democratic-leaning Cook County, she went on to win the general election in a blowout with 72% of the vote.

Many citizens see elections for county-level officials as boring or unimportant, but this is a big mistake—local offices implement most of the governing in some of the most important areas of life, from education to community development. Moreover, these offices often have significant discretion in how they implement their portfolios. This is especially true for local prosecutors in the U.S., who play a pivotal role in setting the agenda for public safety priorities and making particular decisions that powerfully shape peoples' lives. Traditionally, local prosecutors have tended to project a “tough on crime” persona and develop a reputation for harsh punishment. However, such policies may be of dubious effectiveness for actually promoting public safety, and because of pervasive biases at all levels of the criminal justice system (arrests, charges, convictions, and sentencing) have disproportionately harmed members of minority groups. These policies have subjected African Americans in particular to being simultaneously [over-policed and under-policed](#), and have contributed to a range of racial [inequities](#) that [transform](#) the [politics](#) of such communities.

Foxx is part of [a recent wave of reformist prosecutors](#) who have advocated for and begun to implement a range of measures to reform the criminal justice system from the local level, by focusing on harm mitigation rather than punishment. Since taking office, Foxx has supported or enacted [numerous reforms](#) including bail reform, increased transparency, reduction in prosecution of low-level offenses, increased oversight for police-involved shootings, and overturning of wrongful convictions. These efforts have generally drawn praise from progressive advocacy groups and particularly from young Chicagoans most exposed to harsh policing practices. They have been [opposed by police unions and suburban police leaders](#), while Chicago's police commissioners have been more neutral in their evaluations.

## The 2020 Campaign

Foxx's policies and actions during her first term were controversial enough that she faced three challengers, in a down-ballot election where we might expect the incumbent to enjoy an uncontested primary. The most prominent of these opponents was Bill Conway, a former Assistant State's Attorney under Alvarez. Conway's campaign [raised](#) \$11.9 million, including \$10.5 million in cumulative donations from his father, in what turned out to be the most expensive State's Attorney race [to date](#). The two other challengers were Donna More, a former Assistant State's Attorney who also ran in 2016, and Bob Fioretti, a former Chicago alderman and perennial candidate in local elections.

The handling of the Jussie Smollett controversy in early 2019 by Foxx's office also captured a lot of attention, even if it was more attention-grabbing than attention-worthy. Foxx's opponents and some media outlets [focused prominently](#) on the Smollett case during the election, but Foxx's supporters saw the case [as a distraction](#) from the core issues of criminal justice reform. This race can be seen as a kind of test of how voters will respond to this agenda once in place, and whether progressive prosecutors subject to re-election are likely to successfully stay in office.

## Breaking Down Foxx's Win

Foxx won the 2020 primary comfortably, though not overwhelmingly. She won a narrow majority of votes, but the split field of opponents meant her margin of victory was nearly twenty percent.

**Table 1: 2020 Cook County Democratic Party primary election results**

	Votes	Kim Foxx	Bill Conway	Donna More	Bob Fioretti
Chicago	514,605	55.4%	27.6%	12.1%	4.9%
Suburban Cook County	375,786	43.1%	35.7%	16.0%	5.2%
Total	890,391	50.2%	31.0%	13.8%	5.0%

Source: Chicago Board of Elections and Cook County Clerk



While Chicago is by far the largest single community in Cook County, there are approximately equal numbers of registered voters in the city and in suburban Cook County—about 1.5 million in each. As in other metropolitan areas, suburbanites are more likely to be Republicans or conservative than central-city residents, but in Cook County primaries Democrats still outnumber Republicans [more than 2 to 1](#). Foxx ran stronger in Chicago than she did in the Cook suburbs, and turnout among Democrats in both places appears to have dropped significantly from 2016.




Figure 1. Precinct-level vote share for Kim Foxx (left) and Bill Conway (right)

Overall, Foxx’s share of the vote dropped by about 8 percentage points (about 7 percentage points in Chicago and 9 in suburban Cook County). The map in Figure 2 below shows precinct-level changes in Foxx’s share of the vote, with redder areas showing a larger decline in support for Foxx while bluer areas indicate a larger increase in support. In large swathes of the suburbs and North Side, support for Foxx declined by more than ten percent, as indicated by the dark red shade in the map. There were few areas of large increased support over ten percent, but much of the South Side and South suburbs saw modest increases from already-strong support in 2016.




Figure 2: Change in Foxx vote share (percentage points), 2016-2020

The dynamics of the races were very different: in 2016 she was a challenger to an incumbent facing a major cover-up scandal, while in 2020 she is an incumbent defending her record. The overall decline suggests that Foxx’s performance and agenda have been received negatively among some Democrats. But the larger drops in suburban support and the geographic pattern shown in Figure 2 suggest a strong racial component to the changes.

### Race, Segregation, and Support for Foxx

We can investigate this pattern more closely by examining how support for Foxx varies across precinct-level demographics in the 2016 and 2020 elections. We can do so by using data from the U.S. Census Bureau and processing it to estimate precinct-level racial composition.<sup>2</sup> Figures 3-5 below show the conditional average voteshares for each candidate by precinct-level racial composition,<sup>3</sup> in precincts with an estimated majority of white, black, or Latinx residents.<sup>4</sup>

As in 2016, Foxx ran strongest in the predominantly African American South and West Sides of the city, as well as in largely African American suburbs south of the city. Figure 3 shows remarkable levels of support—consistently over 75%—in predominantly black precincts.




Figure 3: Voteshare by precinct black population, 2016 and 2020

As Figure 4 shows, Foxx received much less support in the white parts of the city, and Conway outperformed Foxx on average in precincts with a white population of 60% or more. Foxx experienced a significant drop in support in predominantly white precincts, although the gains from this drop were split by Conway, More, and Fioretti. There is some [regional variation](#) to this pattern: Foxx performed better in white neighborhoods on the Far North Side relative to the Northwest Side and suburban Cook County, although her share of votes declined from 2016 even in the former areas.




Figure 4: Voteshare by precinct white population, 2016 and 2020

The story is more complicated in Chicagoland’s Latinx neighborhoods, as shown in Figure 5. While Foxx received similar levels of support on average in 2016 and 2020 in these areas, Conway did not earn nearly as much support as Alvarez did in 2016. Closer analyses [show](#) that Foxx generally won Latinx precincts on the city’s Northwest and West Sides, but generally lost to Conway in Latinx parts of the Southwest Side and suburban Cook County.




Figure 4: Voteshare by precinct Latinx population, 2016 and 2020

As these figures show, the geographic patterns in the results can largely be explained by the underlying demographic differences between areas. Because many elements of a criminal justice reform agenda are intended to mitigate the effects of systemic racism, it is likely that different racial groups may respond to this agenda and to Foxx, who is African American, differently.

These racial patterns also help explain Foxx's decline in voteshare from 2016 to 2020: the [decline in turnout between elections](#) was much higher in African American neighborhoods, where Foxx found her strongest support, compared to white neighborhoods, where she saw greater losses.

On the whole, Foxx's fairly comfortable re-nomination suggests continued support for criminal justice reform through the office of local prosecutor. However, her significant losses in predominantly white areas suggest that even in an overwhelmingly Democratic metropolitan area, white voters' support for such measures may be less solid than their partisan preferences or national ideology would suggest.

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#### Footnotes

1. In highly Democratic-leaning Cook County, a win in the Democratic primary almost always translates into a general election win. Foxx will face Republican Pat O'Brien in the general election on November 3, 2020.
2. We used 5-year estimates from the most recent American Community Survey. Because Census geography and electoral precincts do not match, estimating precinct demography involve some data processing. To make these estimates, we collected ACS data for Block Groups (BGs) and used a GIS Intersect function to create a new terrain of block-group-precinct fragments across the city. The ACS count for each measure (eg. total population, or non-hispanic white persons) was divided among each BG's fragments according to its proportion of the BG's overall area. Then these proportionate counts were added up according to which precinct they were in, and the estimated percentages (eg. percent non-hispanic white) were created based these newly estimated precinct counts. The key underlying assumption of this procedure is that persons in the categories of interest are evenly distributed within the BG. Because BGs are small (less than half a square mile on average in Chicago), the error potentially introduced by this procedure is outweighed by the advantage of being able to compare election results to demographic characteristics.
3. A loess regression is used to generate the smoothed conditional means lines. For more details, [see documentation here](#). Note that these visualizations do not account for differences in rates of registration and turnout across

precincts. Analyses that do account for such variation show similar patterns.

To see these analyses, please contact the author.

4. Though Chicago overall has no majority group, the vast majority of the city's electorate lives in *precincts* with a majority group: 32% of registered Chicago voters live in majority-black precincts, 35% in majority-white ones, and 19% in majority-Latinx ones. Since only 14 precincts have an estimated majority Asian American population, generating a similar visualization for majority

Asian American precincts would not yield tractable analyses.

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## **[Kumar Ramanathan](#)**

### [Kumar Ramanathan](#)

PhD candidate at Northwestern University

Kumar Ramanathan is a PhD student in Political Science at Northwestern University. His research explores how law and public policy shape racial and gender inequalities, focusing mainly on immigration policy, social policy, and criminal justice policy in the United States. He is interested in finding new ways to connect academic scholarship to public debates about law and policy. Kumar is from Hong Kong by way of Boston.

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**Appendix 2**  
**Black and Latino Districts**

<b>Illinois General Assembly Districts</b> <i>Based on <u>Total Population</u></i>					
<b>Black majority districts</b>	<b>2011 Adopted Maps</b>	<b>May 2021 Adopted</b>		<b>Aug. 2021 Adopted</b>	<b>UCCRO Draft VRA districts</b>
		<b>Reported by ILGA</b>	<b>2020 Census</b>		
State House districts	16	12	9	8	18
State Senate districts	8	6	3	4	At least 7*
<b>Latino majority districts</b>	<b>2011 Adopted Maps</b>	<b>May 2021 Adopted</b>		<b>Aug. 2021 Adopted</b>	<b>UCCRO Draft VRA districts</b>
		<b>Reported by ILGA</b>	<b>2020 Census</b>		
State House districts	14	14	13	13	15
State Senate districts	5	5	5	5	At least 5*
<i>*This estimate only includes Senate districts composed of the 35 House districts that UCCRO has drawn, based on its current draft map. There are 9 House districts UCCRO did not draw the Senate companion House district for.            Note: For the purposes of this slide, "majority" is considered 50.0% or more of the total population.</i>					



<b>Illinois General Assembly Districts</b> <i>Based on <u>Voting Age Population</u></i>			
<b>Black majority districts</b>	<b>2011 Adopted Maps</b>	<b>Aug. 2021 Adopted</b>	<b>UCCRO Draft VRA districts</b>
State House districts	16	9	15
State Senate districts	7	3	At least 7*
<b>Latino majority districts</b>	<b>2011 Adopted Maps</b>	<b>Aug. 2021 Adopted</b>	<b>UCCRO Draft VRA districts</b>
State House districts	10	11	14
State Senate districts	5	4	At least 5*
<p><i>*This estimate only includes Senate districts composed of the 35 House districts that UCCRO has drawn, based on its current draft map. There are 9 House districts UCCRO did not draw the Senate companion House district for.</i></p> <p><i>Note: For the purposes of this slide, "majority" is considered 50.0% or more of the voting age population.</i></p>			